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HARRIS V. QUINN AND FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION:  WHY CONGRESS NEEDS TO 
STEP IN TO EXPAND THE RULING 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Tim works for a public organization.1  One day in July, Tim and his 
coworkers held a meeting to discuss a proposed change—the 
establishment of union representation.  Many of the employees looked 
around in confusion and wondered about the pros and cons of union 
representation.  After further discussion, a vote was held with the majority 
of people voting for union representation.  Tim was upset because he 
voted against union representation and, as a result of the vote, would have 
to pay an unwanted union fee. 
Weeks later, Tim received a letter informing him that all employees 
will be represented by a union within his industry for contract 
administration, grievance adjustment, and collective bargaining issues.  In 
addition, the letter stated that while dues will be enforced, the amount 
would be disclosed at a later time.  Several months later, Tim received a 
letter in the mail detailing the allocation of costs for joining the union.  He 
believes that payment of compelled membership dues for the union 
violates his First Amendment right of freedom of association for being 
forced to support an organization in opposition of his own views. 
Currently, if Tim wants to opt out of paying the fee, the public union 
has the right to terminate his employment.  As a result, if Tim wants a job 
in the public sector, he must support an organization that may have 
opposing views to his own.  The principle of compelling public workers 
to pay a non-membership fee (“agency fee”) towards the representative 
union has been recognized and followed since the 1977 case Abood v. 
Detroit Board of Education.2  At the time, the primary purpose of the agency 
fee was to solve the free rider issue—public employees receiving union 
benefits for free.3  Over the past forty years, the concept of unions 
compelling agency fees to non-members created a divide between public 
employees and unions.4 
                                                 
1 This scenario is fictional and solely the work of the author. 
2 See 431 U.S. 209, 241 (1977) (discussing the significant burden on the employees for 
compelling dues). 
3 See id. at 221–22 (“A union-shop arrangement . . . counteracts the incentive that 
employees might otherwise have to become ‘free riders’—to refuse to contribute to the union 
while obtaining benefits of union representation.”). 
4 See id. at 222 (discussing the impact on First Amendment rights and the need to protect 
the unions). 
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In the summer of 2014, Harris v. Quinn changed the long-established 
principle, but did not overrule Abood.5  Harris bridged the gap between the 
union’s ability to compel an agency fee and the right of public employees 
to freely associate with any organization they wish to support.6  
Specifically, Harris dealt with quasi-public employees and gave them the 
right to opt out of the compelled agency fee.7  The Supreme Court held 
that personal assistants, acting as quasi-public employees, can opt out of 
paying agency fees to support unions, but left open the question of 
whether all public employees will be able to opt out of agency fees to 
protect their freedom of association.8 
The First Amendment right of freedom of association protects 
employees’ rights in the public workforce.9  In order for unions to co-exist 
with employees in the public sector, the courts must ignore the Abood 
standard of permitting agency fees against non-members of the union for 
grievance-adjustment, collective bargaining, and contract administration 
purposes.10  The Abood standard is flawed because it incorrectly applied 
two cases in its analysis regarding the constitutionality of compulsory 
payments, which makes the re-evaluation of the issue necessary to protect 
the freedom of association for all public employees.11 
Part II of this Note discusses the history and development of the 
freedom of association in the U.S. workforce.12  Then, Part III analyzes 
freedom of association in the context of Harris v. Quinn and suggests using 
the misinterpretation of the two cases used in the analysis to replace the 
Abood standard.13  Next, Part IV proposes establishing a new standard 
                                                 
5 See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014) (stating that the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings). 
6 See id. (acknowledging that collecting an agency fee is prohibited by the First 
Amendment from employees that do not want to support or join the union). 
7 See id. (“[N]o person in this country may be compelled to subsidize speech by a third 
party that he or she does not wish to support.”). 
8 See id. (holding that the personal assistants who work in the Rehabilitation Program 
that do not want to support a union cannot be compelled to subsidize their speech by a third 
party). 
9 See id. at 2628 (establishing that the freedom of association was thought to be protected 
by the Bill of Rights). 
10 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977) (explaining that the Michigan 
Court of Appeals was correct in its decision to enforce the service charges for non-members 
applied for collective bargaining, grievance adjustment, and contract administration 
purposes). 
11 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632 (“The Abood Court seriously erred in treating [Railway 
Employees Department v.] Hanson and [International Association of Machinists v.] Street as having 
all but decided the constitutionality of compulsory payments to a public-sector union.”). 
12 See infra Part II (discussing the historical development of freedom of association in the 
workforce). 
13 See infra Part III (analyzing the reasons why the freedom of association is important and 
should cover all public employees). 
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through amending the Employees’ Rights statute that will compensate for 
the inconsistencies in court cases dealing with agency fees and public 
employees.14  Finally, Part V concludes how the new standard will 
improve the public-sector’s working conditions.15 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Ever since the inception of the agency shop provision, the freedom of 
association issues surrounding the union’s ability to compel an agency fee 
from non-members became more problematic over time.16  In Harris, the 
Supreme Court raised serious doubts about the future of agency fees for 
public employees by giving personal assistants the ability to receive union 
benefits by opting out of the agency fee payments.17  These serious doubts 
require immediate action that should result in amending the Employees’ 
Rights statute to give all public employees the right to opt out of agency 
fees.18 
Part II.A discusses the historical development of unions, including the 
original purpose for forming unions and the Acts that gave the unions 
power.19  Next, Part II.B discusses the cases leading up to Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education, including Railway Employees Department v. Hanson and 
International Association of Machinists v. Street.20  Then, Part II.C discusses 
the significance of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, including the factual 
scenario of the case, the purpose behind exclusive representation of 
employees, and how the Court addressed the free rider issue.21  Then, Part 
II.D discusses Harris v. Quinn and the evolution of right to work laws in 
                                                 
14 See infra Part IV (establishing a new standard through a modified statute that all public 
employees will be given the opportunity to opt out of agency fees). 
15 See infra Part V (concluding that the proposed statute is the best solution to protect the 
freedom of association for public employees). 
16 See infra Part II.A (reviewing the formation and historical significance of unions, 
including creating cohesion in the workplace, preventing free riders from using the services 
without payment, and relieving the financial burden for employees of bringing claims 
against the employer). 
17 See infra Part II.D (refusing to extend the standard in Abood to the quasi-public 
employees in Harris because of the flawed analysis in relying on previous cases). 
18 See infra Part IV (proposing an amendment to the Employees’ Rights statute by giving 
all public employees the right to refuse agency fees). 
19 See infra Part II.A (providing an overview of Abood through the detailed factual scenario, 
along with the reasoning behind the decisions made throughout the case). 
20 See infra Part II.B (reviewing the holding and significance of two important cases relied 
upon in Abood, and the evolution of the agency fee system). 
21 See infra Part II.C (examining the holding and reasoning of Abood). 
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the Judicial System.22  Finally, Part II.E discusses the fundamentals of the 
First Amendment, including an overview of freedom of association.23 
A. Historical Development of Unions 
State and federal legislation govern the right of public sector 
employees to organize unions whereas the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”) only governs the private sector.24  In 1902, executive orders 
banned federal employees from petitioning for salary increases in 
Congress because President Roosevelt intended to decrease congressional 
oversight of federal departments and restrict the growing political power 
of civil servant special interest groups.25  In 1912, the Taft administration 
lifted the ban and advocated for the right of employees to petition 
Congress for better working conditions.26  
                                                 
22 See infra Part II.D (explaining the factual scenario, holding, and reasoning in Harris v. 
Quinn). 
23 See infra Part II.E (analyzing the freedom of association as inherently incorporating the 
freedom to associate from organizations, including unions). 
24 See Catherine Phillips, The Lost Democratic Institution of Petitioning:  Public Employee 
Collective Bargaining as a Constitutional Right, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 652, 656 (2012) 
(describing the constitutional framework for public employees as unique compared to other 
citizens).  During 2010, 6.9% of workers in the private-sector were union members, unlike the 
public sector that had forty percent of workers belonging to unions.  Id. at 657.  During 2011, 
thirteen states limited or eliminated public-sector bargaining rights.  See Joseph Slater, The 
Strangely Unsettled State of Public-Sector Labor in the Past Thirty Years, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 511, 532 (2013) (listing the states that limited the bargaining rights in some way as being 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wisconsin). 
25 See Phillips, supra note 24, at 657 (considering the ban as the beginning of the public-
sector movement that incurred more problems in organizing the public workforce than the 
private-sector).  The executive order broadened the ban on petitioning for improved 
conditions and terms in Congress.  See William Herbert, Public Sector Labor Law and History:  
The Politics of Ancient History?, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 335, 348 (2011) (discussing the 
history behind the effort to curtail the right of public employees to seek improvements of 
working conditions).  The following language applied to all federal employees: 
All officers and employees of the United States of every description 
serving in or under any of the Executive Departments and whether so 
serving in or out of Washington are hereby forbidden either direct or 
indirect, individually or through associations, to solicit an increase of 
pay, or to influence or to attempt to influence in their own interest any 
legislation whatever, either before Congress or its Committees, or in any 
way save through the heads of the Departments in or under which they 
serve, on penalty of dismissal from the government service. 
Id. 
26 See Phillips, supra note 24, at 657 (explaining the ban as being lifted by the Lloyd-
LaFollette Act of 1912).  Additionally, the administration attempted to limit the interactions 
between legislative bodies and public employees on the state level.  Id.  Even though the ban 
was lifted, various lobbying efforts attempted to ban unions in the public sector outside the 
federal government.  See Herbert, supra note 25, at 349 (distinguishing that lobbying for 
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After 1912, the public sector was still having issues organizing unions, 
but private sector unions received statutory protections with the passing 
of the NLRA in 1935.27  Two years later, skepticism continued to exist 
concerning public workers pursuing collective bargaining or unionization 
because of the nature of the industry.28  The subsequent court decisions 
displayed antagonism towards unions and produced greater skepticism 
until the 1960s.29 
In 1962, President Kennedy gave federal public employees limited 
collective bargaining rights and established union recognition procedures 
through Executive Order 10988.30  The states used the federal 
                                                 
legislative action to improve working conditions appears at both the state and federal levels).  
In addition to petitioning Congress, the lifted ban also permitted employees to furnish 
information to the House of Representatives or the Senate.  Id. at 349. 
27 See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, 449–551 (1935) 
(diminishing labor disputes and creating the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”)); see 
also Phillips, supra note 24, at 657–58 (detailing the benefits of the Act as permitting workers 
to petition, organize, boycott, strike, and collectively bargain).  The Act provided the private-
sector statutory protection by assuring the right to organize through unions, to bargain 
collectively through the employers, and to protect other activity related to the collective 
bargaining process.  See Henry H. Drummonds, Reforming Labor Law by Reforming Labor Law 
Preemption Doctrine to Allow the States to Make More Labor Relations Policy, 70 LA. L. REV. 97, 
114 (2009) (exploring the evidence pointing to the NLRA as promising more than what it can 
fulfill).  One of the downsides of the NLRA is that threats fall outside of it.  Id. 
28 See Phillips, supra note 24, at 658 (explaining that Franklin Roosevelt believed that 
collective bargaining could not fit within the public sector).  President Roosevelt reasoned: 
The very nature and purposes of government make it impossible for 
administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in 
mutual discussions with government employee organizations.  The 
employer is the whole people, who speak by . . . laws enacted by their 
representatives in Congress.  Accordingly, administrative officials and 
employers alike are governed and guided, and in many cases restricted, 
by laws which establish policies, procedure or rules in personnel 
matters. 
Id. 
29 See id. at 659 (describing the Court’s holding as giving public employees no right to 
bargain, strike, or arbitrate disputes).  In this time period, employees could be fired for 
conducting activity that resembled union organization.  Id.  Between the 1930s and 1940s, 
memberships within unions tripled, and around twenty-five percent of the workforce 
unionized.  See Marisa Benson & Tiffany Nichols, Labor Organizations and Labor Relations HB 
361, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 191, 191–92 (2013) (analyzing the history of union memberships and 
the related bills that restricted its growth).  Following the growth of union memberships, 
Congress introduced 250 bills related to unions in 1947.  Id. at 192. 
30 See Deborah Prokopf, Public Employees at the School of Hard Knox:  How the Supreme Court 
Is Turning Public-Sector Unions into a History Lesson, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1363, 1366 
(2013) (stating that Executive Order 10988 was considered the Magna Carta for unionism 
with federal-employees).  Even though the discussion on collective bargaining began with 
Executive Order 10988, organized labor activity occurred as early as the 1830s.  See Kenneth 
Bullock, Official Time as Form of Union Security in Federal Sector Labor-Management Relations, 
59 A.F.L. REV. 153, 164 (2007) (introducing the first organized labor activity occurring in 
Sullivan: Harris v. Quinn and Freedom of Association: Why Congress Needs to
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016
578 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
government’s authority to establish and pass legislation that granted 
public employees at the local and state level the authority to bargain with 
unions.31  As a result, union memberships for public employees increased 
500% between 1956 and 1978.32  As public-sector unions grew, the private-
sector unionization rates declined.33  Currently, the laws have adapted to 
meet the demand of public-sector unions.34  Part II.A.1 explains the current 
status of the law for unions, including collective bargaining on behalf of 
public employees, exclusivity of the union-employee relationship, and 
                                                 
Navy yards to obtain ten-hour workdays without reducing the employee’s pay).  Between 
the 1860s and 1880s, the prevailing rate wages were recognized by Congress and eight-hour 
days were implemented.  Id. at 164–65. 
31 See Prokopf, supra note 30, at 1366 (recognizing that the states modeled their legislation 
after the federal government).  Following the federal government’s first step toward 
unionism accelerated the enactment of state legislation.  Id.  Up to the 1980s, forty-two states 
enacted collective bargaining for public employees.  Id.  In 1959, Wisconsin passed the first 
state public sector labor law, but lacked a foundation for granting public sector unions rights.  
See Joseph E. Slater, The Assault on Public Sector Collective Bargaining:  Real Harms and 
Imaginary Benefits, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2011), https://www.acslaw.org/ 
sites/default/files/Slater_Collective_Bargaining.pdf [https://perma.cc/FRF9-FP4S] 
(establishing the struggle with being the first state to establish the public sector labor law).  
The Wisconsin law focused on barring strikes through the use of fact-finding, mediation, and 
binding interest arbitration.  Id. 
32 See Prokopf, supra note 30, at 1366 (analyzing the growth of unions within the public 
sector as growing exponentially between the periods of 1960 to 1978).  By 1978, unions 
represented about forty percent of all public employees.  Id.  During the 1970s, unions 
appeared to be well-established in the labor markets.  See John Pencavel, The Changing Size 
Distribution of U.S. Trade Unions and Its Description by Pareto’s Distribution, 67 INDST. & LAB. 
RELS. REV. 138, 140 (2014) (recognizing the fluctuation in union memberships between the 
years 1974 to 2007).  Around 20 million employees were members of unions, and 8000 union 
elections occurred each year.  Id.  In 1974, the only union that had substantial representation 
among employees was the National Education Association.  Id.  However, most unions were 
not subject to collective bargaining contracts.  Id. at 141. 
33 See Prokopf, supra note 30, at 1366–67 (stating while peak union membership was at 
34.8% in 1954, the overall union membership in 2012 was at 11.3%, and the union 
membership in the private sector was at 6.6% and 35.9% in the public sector).  The decline in 
national private sector unionization is attributable to the NLRB interpreting the NLRA in 
less favorable ways towards collective bargaining and unionization.  See Ann C. Hodges, 
Lessons from the Laboratory:  The Polar Opposites on the Public Sector Labor Law Spectrum, 18 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 735, 743 (2009) (comparing the unionization rates among Illinois 
and Virginia).  The public-sector unionization rates also depend upon the state law, which 
may be more hostile towards collective bargaining.  Id. 
34 See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the status of current laws in regards to union 
membership).  In 2013, twenty-two states provided arbitration as a resolution procedure for 
the public employees.  See Harry C. Katz, Is U.S. Public Sector Labor Relations in the Midst of a 
Transformation?, 66 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 1031, 1035 (2013) (distinguishing the state laws 
as only covering firefighters and police, rather than all state employees).  The threat of 
arbitration alone is enough to reach a negotiation within the collective bargaining process.  
Id. 
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closed-shop agreements.35  Then, Part II.A.2 discusses the Taft-Hartley 
Act, including the purpose and importance of the Act.36 
1. Current Status of the Law 
Under current state and federal law, when a union is selected by a 
majority of the employees, it will represent all the employees within the 
bargaining unit for collective bargaining purposes.37  Collective 
bargaining is the process where unions negotiate the terms of the 
employees’ contracts with the employers.38  Employers prefer the 
exclusivity of the union because the employer can address one group’s 
stance rather than multiple stances.39  The use of a single representative 
promotes a state of cohesion among employees and avoids inter-union 
rivalries.40 
                                                 
35 See infra Part II.A.1 (examining the current status of law dealing with unions). 
36 See infra Part II.A.2 (detailing reasons why Section 14(b) was enacted along with the 
benefits of the Act). 
37 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012) (“Representatives designated or selected for the purposes 
of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit . . . shall be the exclusive 
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining 
[for] . . .  pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.”); see also 
Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975) (establishing that 
as long as the majority of employees select union representation, the NLRA permits unions 
to bargain with employers to make the union membership a condition of employment). 
38 See Collective Bargaining Fact Sheet, AFL-CIO AMERICA’S UNIONS, 
http://www.aflcio.org/Learn-About-Unions/Collective-Bargaining/Collective-Bargaining 
-Fact-Sheet [http://perma.cc/Q2Y3-RWPE] (describing the terms included in employment 
contracts during collective bargaining as hours, pay, pensions, benefits, health care, leave, 
safety policies, and more).  The employees, as a collective unit, decide the priorities for 
bargaining with the employers.  Id.  The union employees will choose the representative that 
will speak on their behalves for bargaining sessions, with the end result being a contract 
between the employer and employees.  Id.  Each year, around 30,000 collective bargaining 
agreements are formed, representing around eight million private employees and 8.5 million 
public employees.  Id. 
39 See Emporium Capwell Co., 420 U.S. at 62 (examining the benefits of having a union).  The 
problem with this system is that total satisfaction for all is difficult to achieve for those who 
are represented by a union.  Id.  The use of a single union helps further the goal of promoting 
peace among the workforce by subordinating the individual interests for the collective 
interests of every employee within the bargaining unit.  See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 
(1967) (reviewing the reasons for a collective bargaining system).  The exclusive 
representative also solves the issue of impartial review through discriminatory or arbitrary 
union conduct.  Id. 
40 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220–21 (1977) (discussing the advantages 
that an exclusive union brings, rather than having multiple employee groups demanding 
different variant conditions and terms of employment).  Congress designed exclusive 
representation to strengthen the overall union power and decrease the monopoly power of 
the employer within its own organization.  See David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law 
Accommodate Collective Bargaining by Professional Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689, 693 (1990) 
(providing the basic description behind the necessity of exclusive representation).  Exclusive 
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Even though the union represents all of the employees, employees are 
not required to join.41  The exclusivity portion requires that only the union 
represent every employee for collective bargaining issues, regardless of 
whether every employee voted for it.42  Unions do not have to address 
every claim, but must utilize the duty of fair representation without any 
sort of discrimination or bad faith.43  Whether or not the employees are 
members, they still receive the union benefits, ranging from enforcement 
of contractual rights to free legal representation in arbitrations.44 
There are several and often opposing opinions concerning the 
decision to create a union because the unions represent such a large 
amount of employees.45  For instance, the competing interests of 
                                                 
representation also prohibits employers from dealings between non-union employees and 
individuals.  Id.  Without the designation of exclusive representation, unions would lose their 
power to bargain efficiently and effectively by having to compete against other individuals 
or unions.  Id. 
41 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (detailing the right of employees to join or refrain from joining 
a union); Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights After 
Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1030 (2013) (identifying that represented 
employees are bound by the union’s negotiating decisions even if the employees do not join 
the union). 
42 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012) (acknowledging the union’s duty to be the exclusive 
representative of the organization).  The collective bargaining issues encompass hours of 
employment, rates of pay, wages, and other employment conditions.  Id.  Furthermore, the 
employees have the right to present any grievances to the employer and have the grievances 
adjusted unless the adjustment is inconsistent with the collective bargaining terms in the 
contract.  Id.; see also 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 270 (2009) (recognizing that 
the needs of the larger work force are balanced with the economic interests of employees to 
negotiate collective bargaining agreements). 
43 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)–(3) (2012) (implementing the requirement that labor 
organizations use a duty of fair representation with no discrimination).  The labor 
organization cannot cause an employer to discriminate against an employee for a denied 
membership resulting from reasons other than non-payment of dues.  Id. § 158(b)(2).  In 
addition, the union is obligated to confer in good faith in determining hours, wages, and 
other conditions of employment.  Id. § 158(d); see Pyett, 556 U.S. at 271 (finding that if the 
union’s conduct involves bad faith, discrimination, or arbitrariness, then the union breached 
the duty of fair representation). 
44 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (confirming that the labor organization cannot terminate 
benefits to non-members); see also Pyett, 556 U.S. at 271 (holding that unions have a duty to 
represent employees in negotiation activities); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967) (stating 
that unions have a duty to represent employees to enforce contractual rights).  The benefit 
shared by non-members do not include ideological or political benefits provided by unions.  
See Harry G. Hutchison, Reclaiming the Labor Movement Through Union Dues?  A Postmodern 
Perspective in the Mirror of Public Choice Theory, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 447, 486 (2000) 
(showing that there should be some benefits that only members can receive for paying the 
extra premium for full access to all the benefits). 
45 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 1030 (identifying that every decision the union 
makes will not be supported by every employee).  Opposing opinions are the direct result of 
differences between members and non-members of unions.  See Daniel A. Himebaugh, Note, 
Consider the Source:  A Note on Public-Sector Union Expenditure Restrictions Upheld in Davenport 
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increasing health benefits at the cost of decreasing wages, to giving 
promotions based on quality of work rather than seniority, will disappoint 
some employees that have opposing viewpoints.46  However, differences 
in employee opinions over the negotiation terms do not make the terms 
invalid.47  To counter the differences, the law requires unions to represent 
the employees fairly.48 
Some industries require closed-shop agreements, which force 
employees to be members of a union as a condition of employment.49  To 
prevent free riders from gaining from the system, union activists 
determined that all employees must pay to retain benefits produced by 
                                                 
v. Washington Education Association, 28 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 533, 536 (2008) 
(providing that non-members are compelled to pay agency fees because of the inability to 
become a member and adopt the union’s viewpoints).  Abood established the ability for 
employees to object to the ideological viewpoints of unions.  Id. at 536–37. 
46 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 1030–31 (weighing the different scenarios that 
may disappoint employees).  Unions have to make trade-offs that will negatively affect some 
employees.  Id. at 1031.  The purpose is for the union to make sacrifices to further the 
efficiency of production for employment security.  See Matthew Dimick, Compensation, 
Employment Security, and the Economics of Public-Sector Labor Law, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 533, 542 
(2012) (admitting that risk-averse employees will choose work security over higher wages).  
The risk-neutral employees provide a different prospective by preferring the competitive 
market to determine the level of employment protection, thus maximizing the level of the 
firm’s productivity.  Id. at 543.  The political power of public-sector unions could increase 
both employment security and wages, but this comes at a cost of waiving freedom of 
association in the workforce.  Id. at 547. 
47 See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) (elaborating that bargaining 
representatives who serve employees must exercise honesty and good faith in using 
reasonable discretion).  The employees have the option of being members or non-members 
of a union, but the union continues to have exclusive representation over all employees.  Id.  
Differences arise within the terms of the negotiated agreement that affect individual and 
classes of employees.  Id.  Employers and unions alike do not expect complete satisfaction 
among every employee.  Id.  For these reasons, the statutory authority governing unions 
provides for reasonableness in serving employees.  Id. 
48 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2012) (discussing the duty of fair representation required for 
unions as exclusive representatives of an industry); see also Steele v. Louisville & Nashville 
R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944) (recognizing a duty imposed on unions to exercise their power 
fairly among employees, without hostile discrimination); Martin H. Malin, The Supreme Court 
and the Duty of Fair Representation, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 127, 127 (1992) (finding the 
primary legal duty to hold unions accountable to employees is authorized by the duty of fair 
representation).  But see Michael J. Goldberg, The Duty of Fair Representation:  What the Courts 
Do in Fact, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 89, 96 (1985) (concluding that the duty of fair representation fails 
to protect employees from discriminatory, arbitrary, or perfunctory union conduct). 
49 See Alvaro Santos, Three Transnational Discourses of Labor Law in Domestic Reforms, 32 U. 
PA. J. INT’L L. 123, 142–43 (2010) (explaining that employers could require financial 
contributions and union membership to be an employee of that organization).  Since the 
formation of the closed-shop agreements, judicial and legislative action eroded all forms of 
security agreements.  Id.  The Taft-Hartley Act later prohibited the closed-shop agreement.  
Id. at 143.  The Supreme Court holding analyzed the prohibition, stating that unions can only 
use non-member fees for collective bargaining purposes.  Id. 
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unions, resulting in non-members still having to pay fees.50  Unions 
utilized monopolized power over employee interests to ensure high 
professional standards.51  Some unions strongly believe in the 
monopolized power and require employees to be members of the union 
that are represented in a particular industry.52  The Wagner Act originally 
permitted these closed-shop agreements, requiring union membership for 
employment purposes.53  The liberty of a party to enter into union 
contracts is impinged because the arrangements of the constitutional 
constraints stretch beyond a reasonable interpretation of the freedom of 
association.54 
                                                 
50 See Malin, supra note 48, at 146 (stating that the fees were necessary for the unions to 
exclusively represent the employees, as long as the fees do not significantly place any burden 
on free speech).  Abood established that non-members of a union can be required to pay a fee 
for the costs of collective bargaining.  See Fisk & Chemerinksy, supra note 41, at 1053 
(acknowledging that unions could require non-members of a union to pay for collective 
bargaining activities, but not for ideological purposes).  Furthermore, the Court said that the 
bar could compel similar fees for use of disciplining members or proposing ethical codes.  Id. 
51 See Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 US. 415, 438–40 (1963) 
(highlighting the State’s argument to control the employees’ exclusive representation in 
order to protect personal liberty interests).  The union restrictions over its employees 
functions as a monopolized power.  See Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for 
Union Representation, 94 VA. L. REV. 1, 56 (2008) (acknowledging that the restrictions that 
provide unions the ability for exclusive representation ultimately create a monopolized 
power for unions over the employees).  Unlike most monopolies, nonprofit labor unions are 
exempt from antitrust laws and regulations.  Id. 
52 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under the National Labor 
Relations Act:  The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court’s Opinion in Beck, 27 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 51, 57–61 (1990) (discussing the ramifications of requiring employment based on union 
membership).  This reasoning goes directly towards the necessity of limitations on union 
competition.  See Bodie, supra note 51, at 56 (examining the reasoning behind limiting union 
competition).  Competition between unions wastes union resources.  Id.  In addition, when 
the union represents a large percentage of the employees within an industry, unions can use 
the collective worker power more effectively.  Id. 
53 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2012) (stating that nothing in the statute can preclude an 
employer from negotiating with a labor organization and conditioning employment based 
on membership); JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 28 (H. Victoria Hedian 
et al. eds., 6th ed. 2012) (describing the proposed legislation of the Wagner Act).  The Wagner 
Act gave employees the legally enforceable right to organize.  HIGGINS, JR., supra note 53, at 
28.  New requirements were implemented that forced employers to utilize representatives 
selected by the employees for purposes of collective bargaining between employers and 
employees.  Id.  The Wagner Act permitted employees to engage in strikes to balance the 
bargaining power between employees and employers.  Id.  The Wagner Act implemented 
the NLRB to enforce substantive rights and protect employees from unfair labor practices.  
Id. at 29. 
54 See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 52, at 131 (concluding that public employees, who are 
subject to these constitutional constraints, would have their liberty impinged by extending 
the Constitution beyond a reasonable interpretation).  The government, through the 
utilization of unions, must subject its performance to constitutional scrutiny, or else the 
Constitution would be undermined.  Id. at 131–32.  Without the constitutional scrutiny, the 
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2. The Taft-Hartley Act 
Congress recognized the need to enforce employment agreements to 
limit employees from free riding on the provided services and benefits.55  
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 added several rights for employers and 
employees by giving them both the right to refrain from joining unions 
and giving the unions the right to require membership within thirty days 
of employment.56  In the union shop arrangement, employees may be fired 
for failing to pay the required dues.57  The Taft-Hartley Act arose from the 
congressional concern over intimidation from unregulated monopolists 
over employees.58 
                                                 
government could authorize private parties for tax collection, elections, law enforcement, 
and benefit distribution with none of the required constraints by the constitution.  Id. at 132. 
55 See Raymond L. Hogler, The Historical Misconception of Right to Work Laws in the United 
States:  Senator Robert Wagner, Legal Policy, and the Decline of American Unions, 23 HOFSTRA 
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 101, 131–32 (2005) (recognizing that making employment conditional on 
union membership was necessary to combatting the free rider issue).  However, employees 
were not required to pay dues used for purposes other than the cost of operation.  See 
Hutchison, supra note 44, at 464 (providing the potential abuses of compulsory unionism).  
In addition, the collective goods provided by the government are theoretically non-
excludable and makes the prevention of free-riding necessary to offset the total costs.  Id. at 
477. 
56 See Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (equalizing the legal 
responsibilities of employers and labor organizations, providing additional facilities for 
mediations concerning labor disputes in regards to commerce, and amending the NLRA).  
The NLRA transformed labor relations to a more balanced scheme by guaranteeing freedoms 
of speech among employers and employees, and the NLRA added more restrictions for 
unions.  See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (“Employees shall have the right . . . to refrain from any or 
all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement 
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized 
in section 158(a)(3) of this title.”); see also HIGGINS, JR., supra note 53, at 41 (emphasizing the 
need for collective bargaining and federal protection of rights of employees to form unions). 
57 See NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963) (noting that union membership 
could only be conditioned upon payment of fees and could be a condition of employment).  
In addition to the fee requirement, the union shop agreement requires employees to follow 
the labor contract by working with the union for any issues concerning the terms of 
employment.  See Roberto L. Corrada, Religious Accommodation and the National Labor Relations 
Act, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 185, 223 (1996) (explaining the requirements and protection 
provided by Section 8(a)(3)).  The union shop agreement also provides for the union to be 
designated as the exclusive representative for all employees.  Id. at 224. 
58 See supra note 55, at 130 (stating that the legislatures favored individuals over unions in 
the new law).  The Taft-Hartley Act provided protection to employees from unfair union 
practices.  See 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-
we-are/our-history/1947-taft-hartley-substantive-provisions [http://perma.cc/T6YX-
SY88] (focusing on the purpose behind the Taft-Hartley Act).  In addition to providing 
protection to employees, the Taft-Hartley Act prohibited unions from charging dues that 
were excessive or not performed.  Id. 
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The Taft-Hartley Act enacted section 14(b), giving states the ability to 
entirely disallow union security agreements.59  Even though every state 
has discretion to use Section 14(b), the right to work law prohibits 
employers and unions from using union membership as a condition for 
employment.60  The right to work law also makes security clauses 
unenforceable by unions, including agency fee arrangements.61  Under 
Section 14(b), unions are still required to provide benefits to non-payers 
because state law bars unions from compulsory membership.62  The 
                                                 
59 See 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (2012) (holding that employers cannot condition employment 
based on union membership);  see also Michael L. Wachter, The Striking Success of the National 
Labor Relations Act, 37 REG. 20, 23 (2014) (describing Section 14(b) as allowing states to 
mandate the open-shop agreement if the right to work laws passed within the state).  The 
open-shop agreement permits employees to not pay dues or join a union.  Wachter, supra 
note 59, at 23.  See Jeanne Mirer, Right-to-Work Laws:  History and Fightback, 70 NAT’L L. GUILD 
REV. 30, 33 (2013) (noting that unions challenged the law on many different grounds).  The 
unions stated the following as challenges against the right to work laws: 
(1) [T]hat these laws abridged freedom of speech, assembly and the right 
to petition; (2) that they conflicted with Art. I, § 10, of the United States 
Constitution [because] they impaired the obligation of contracts made 
prior to their enactment; (3) that they denied equal protection of the laws 
and (4) that they denied due process by interfering with liberty of 
contract. 
Id.  Each argument failed.  Id. 
60 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 1032 (expressing that the Taft-Hartley Act 
gave states with right to work laws the ability to prohibit union security and agency fee 
agreements).  In right to work states, employees who are union members are required to 
subsidize the benefits to coworkers that choose not to join the union.  Id. at 1033. 
61 See Norman L. Cantor, Uses and Abuses of the Agency Shop, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 61, 
61 (1983) (stating that there is a union security agreement between the NLRA and Railway 
Labor Act (“RLA”) that requires all employees represented by a union to contribute an 
equivalent amount of initiation fees and periodic dues that are required by full members).  
The workers who choose not to be union members are still bound by the security 
arrangement, known as an agency shop.  Id. at 61–62.  The agency shop fees are used for the 
union’s activities ranging from contract functions to institutional costs.  Id. at 62.  See Kenneth 
Glenn Dau-Schmidt et al., The Great Recession, the Resulting Budget Shortfalls, the 2010 Elections 
and the Attack on Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the United States, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & 
EMP. L.J. 407, 428–29 (2012) (discussing the basis behind right-to-work and the agency fees).  
The following is a break-down of the number of states with right to work laws from 2012: 
There are currently twenty-three states that have “right to work” laws 
either by state or via constitutional provision.  Eleven states passed right 
to work laws either before or contemporaneously with the passage of 
the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947.  Seven states passed right to work 
laws in the 1950s. . . .  Despite spirited opposition and a boycott by 
Democrats, the House and Senate Republicans passed the legislation, 
and Governor Daniels signed it on February 1, 2012, making Indiana the 
twenty-third right to work state. 
Id. at 429–30. 
62 See Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318, 328–29 (1953) (holding that right-to-work laws 
prohibit unions from enforcing compulsory membership dues on non-members, and the 
statutory duty still requires the unions to provide the benefits to non-members). 
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current member dues subsidize services for non-members that opt out of 
the agency fee system.63  Subsidizing dues from current members 
decreases the amount of money for unions to spend on collective 
bargaining.64  Some states utilize fee for service agreements where non-
members are charged only for the services that directly impact them 
within the industry.65  In addition, cases and statutes exist that permit 
unions to charge non-members for a small list of services, such as utilizing 
arbitration and filing grievances.66  The unions and employers, for both 
right to work states and states that recognize union security, can only 
enforce agency fees on non-members to facilitate the administering and 
negotiating of the employment contract.67  Several suits were filed and the 
case law began to develop after the Taft-Hartley Act passed.68 
                                                 
63 See Martin H. Malin, Does Public Employee Collective Bargaining Distort Democracy?  A 
Perspective from the United States, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 277, 294 (2013) (describing that 
in the absence of an agency shop agreement, union membership will decrease and the 
member dues used to subsidize representation of non-members will increase). 
64 See id. at 292 (explaining that the union is required to represent all employees within 
the bargaining unit, so the members must subsidize the non-members that are employed 
within the same unit).  Overall, funds for collective bargaining will decrease with an absence 
of a security fee provision because employees will choose the rational decision to not join a 
union.  Id.  Improved working conditions and wages sought by the union are considered 
collective goods and cannot be withheld from non-members of the union.  Id. 
65 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 1033 (expressing that unions utilize fee for 
service agreements in right to work states).  Even in states that have not adopted right to 
work laws, unions and employers cannot force an employee to join a union.  Id. at 1034.  The 
unions can only require non-members to pay an agency fee.  Id. 
66 See, e.g., Cone v. Nevada SEIU Local 1107, 998 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Nev. 2000) (holding that 
the service fee requirement for arbitrations does not violate the right to work laws of Nevada 
because the fee is not a condition of employment); United Ass’n of Journeymen Local Union 
No. 81, 237 N.L.R.B. 207, 209–10 (Nev. 1978) (stating that for use of union hiring halls, the 
unions can charge non-members fees).  But see United Ass’n of Journeymen Local Union No. 
141 v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1257, 1259, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (examining that right to work laws in 
Louisiana, Florida, Mississippi, and Arkansas prohibit fair share fees); Am. Fed’n of State, 
Cty. & Municipal Emps., AFL-CIO, Local 2384 v. City of Phoenix, 142 P.3d 234, 245 (Ariz. 
2006) (determining that the union’s fair share agreement violates Arizona’s right to work 
law); Florida Ed. Ass’n/United v. Public Emps. Relations Comm’n, 346 So.2d 551, 553 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (identifying that the right to work law in Florida prohibits fair share 
fees). 
67 See NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 737 (1963) (acknowledging that 
conditional employment can require payment of monthly dues and initiation fees).  The 
agency fees cover union expenditures for retirement and educational benefits, union 
promotional activities and publications, and for strike benefits.  Id.  However, being a non-
member of a union eliminates the entitlements of voting on ratification of union agreements, 
attending union meetings, or having a voice within the union’s internal affairs.  Id. 
68 See infra Part II.B–D (detailing the progression of case law regarding the freedom of 
association and agency fees associated with union membership). 
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B. Building up to Abood v. Detroit Board of Education 
In Railway Employees’ Department v. Hanson, the Supreme Court 
rejected the agency fee system.69  In Hanson, employees of the railroad 
company brought the suit against the Union Pacific Railroad Company 
and separate labor organizations seeking to enjoin the implementation of 
a union shop agreement between the labor organizations and the railroad 
company.70  Before Abood and Harris, the Court in Hanson made two 
important holdings:  (1) the Court held that the Railway Labor Act’s 
(“RLA”) preemption of the right to work laws adequately supported the 
union shop agreements protected by the Constitution; and (2) the Court 
held that unions compelling financial support do not violate the First and 
Fifth Amendments due to the employees still receiving benefits.71  The 
Court made no holding regarding the issue of compulsory membership 
impairing employees’ freedom of expression and left it for another court 
to address.72 
                                                 
69 See 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956) (recognizing that the exaction of initiation fees, dues, or 
assessments could be used as a disguise to force an ideological viewpoint on the employee, 
and should not be allowed).  In Hanson, the Union Pacific Railroad Company employees 
sought to prohibit the enforcement of the RLA between the labor organization and railroad 
company because of a violation of Nebraska’s right to work provision.  Id. at 227–28.  The 
RLA’s original purpose was to strike down and supersede inconsistent state laws.  Id. at 231–
32.  The agency fee system is an alteration of private taxation where all employees, including 
non-members, of a public-sector union paid dues as a condition for government 
employment.  See Himebaugh, supra note 45, at 536 (stating that this private taxation was for 
the purpose of safeguarding the unions, even if the public employees objected to being 
members of a union). 
70 See 351 U.S. at 227 (examining the terms of the union shop agreement as requiring 
membership of the unions within sixty days as a condition of their employment).  The Court 
relied upon the RLA, which permitted a labor organization to require employee membership 
of the labor organization and could terminate the membership for failure to pay the dues.  
See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2012) (requiring labor organizations to maintain agreements concerning 
rules, rates of pay, working conditions, and settling disputes).  Without the RLA superseding 
the state right to work laws, a private agreement between the nonprofit union organization 
and the private employer might have been conjured with the union compelling membership 
dues combined with the subsequent union expenditures.  See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 
41, at 1034 (explaining that the private agreement would make the First Amendment 
irrelevant to the issue). 
71 See Hanson, 351 U.S. at 232 (describing that as long as the union agreements were 
pursuant to the RLA, then no provision could make the agreements illegal under the first 
holding).  The second holding stated that the requirement of financial support is within the 
scope of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause, which does not violate the First or 
Fifth Amendments.  Id. at 238; see also Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 1034 (identifying 
the two important holdings in Hanson). 
72 See Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238 (acknowledging that the Court will not address the 
impairment of freedom of expression).  Congress made explicit that the only conditions that 
can be imposed on union members are initiation fees, period dues, and assessments.  Id.  The 
Court ultimately held that financial support for collective bargaining purposes does not 
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Five years later, the Court addressed the issue of employees’ freedom 
of expression in International Association of Machinists v. Street.73  In Street, 
employees of the Southern Railway System brought a constitutional claim, 
alleging that compelled funds were wrongfully used for political 
propaganda and ideologies that most employees opposed.74  The Superior 
Court enjoined the enforcement of the union shop agreement based on a 
violation of the Constitution because the constitutional right to be free 
from government compulsion has higher value over the expression of 
opinions.75 
The Supreme Court recognized constitutional questions as concerning 
the “utmost gravity,” but then failed to address these questions.76  Instead, 
the Court held the RLA limited the power of unions to spend exacted 
money.77  In addition, the Court interpreted the statute as eliminating the 
union’s power, over an employee’s objection, to use his union dues for 
                                                 
violate the First Amendment and the Commerce Clause supports it.  Id. 
73 See 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961) (confirming the current case as being adequate to present 
the constitutional issues reserved in Hanson).  Hanson did not address the issue of using 
agency shop fees for the advancement of political causes.  See Cantor, supra note 61, at 67 
(clarifying that the plurality refused to address the constitutional issue by interpreting the 
RLA in a narrow way). 
74 See 367 U.S. at 742 (explaining the allegation for the claim).  The employees alleged that 
section 2 of the RLA was unconstitutional because it allowed unions to use compulsory dues 
for financing political campaigns that were opposed by objectors.  See Roger C. Hartley, 
Constitutional Values and the Adjudication of Taft-Hartley Act Dues Objector Cases, 41 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1, 19 (1989) (recognizing that employees opposed the propaganda of economic and 
political doctrines advocated by the unions). 
75 See Street, 367 U.S. at 744–45 (stating that the Superior Court enjoined the enforcement 
of the union shop agreement because demanding funds from employees violates the Federal 
Constitution).  Men and women migrated to the United States to free themselves of 
government compulsion of ideas they were knowingly against.  See id. at 796 (examining that 
migrants went to the extent of languishing in prison and losing their lives to oppose 
government oppression).  Once the government steps into a voluntary membership 
organization and forces a particular cause on a group, then the government may have a 
monopoly on the ideas of its people.  Id. 
76 See id. at 749 (identifying that the Court should refrain from making unnecessary 
constitutional decisions that are outside the scope of the statutory language concerning 
union shop agreements).  Instead of reaching the constitutional decision, the Court 
recognized that Hanson identified the limits on compulsory dues that explained the RLA’s 
statutory constraints over objectors of union activity.  See Hartley, supra note 74, at 19 
(reviewing the reason why the Court did not have to make a constitutional decision in the 
case to provide the necessary remedy to the parties). 
77 See Street, 367 U.S. at 768 (holding that Congress did not give complete approval to 
union shop agreements).  The Court did not want to provide precise limits on the power to 
spend required dues on political causes.  Id.  In addition, the Court recognized that political 
uses of exacted funds do not defray the costs for administration or negotiation of collective 
agreements.  Id.  Therefore, the Court held that unions cannot support political activity 
against the dissenting employees’ wishes.  Id. at 770. 
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opposing political causes.78  In other words, if an employee objects to a 
portion of the union dues used for political purposes, the union has no 
recourse or right to enforce the dues.79  The principles from the majority 
in Hanson and Street remained the same until 1977 with Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education, which dealt with the public-sector.80 
C. 1977 Paradigm of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education 
In Abood, the Detroit Federation of Teachers was designated as the 
exclusive representative for teachers employed within the Detroit Board 
of Education.81  The agreement contained an agency shop clause that 
                                                 
78 See id. at 768–69 (discussing the holding as achieving both congressional purposes when 
using the funds that are directly within the dissenting employee’s interest).  The Court 
explained that the role of unions are delineated and defined to stabilize labor relations across 
any industry.  See id. at 758–59 (recognizing every stage in the progression of the railroad 
labor code was progressively infused with a balance of the organizing railroads and railroad 
unions).  In addition, non-union members sharing the same benefits as members for no cost 
(free riders) weighed against an argument for complete recognition of freedom of choice for 
individuals.  See Street, 367 U.S. at 762–63 (acknowledging the challenges of unions that 
exclusively represent all of the employees in an industry, including those who do not share 
in payment of the dues).  In this case, the RLA contemplated compulsory unionism to battle 
the costs of disputes against forcing employees to provide the costs for administering and 
negotiating collective agreements.  Id. at 763–64.  However, the Court held that Congress did 
not intend to compel employees to support opposing political causes that are different from 
their own beliefs.  Id. at 764.  In a dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter argued that 
members’ interests could be furthered by political means.  Id. at 813–15.  He explained that 
the AFL-CIO Executive Council Reports stressed the importance of labor’s participation in 
furthering legislation quickly because the political and economic concerns are inseparable.  
Id. at 813.  The dissent further argued that the employees were free to speak on any issue 
concerning the union’s position, which equated to no coercion of speech within union 
activism.  See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 1036 (explaining that the dissent believed 
that the employees were not forced to give up any beliefs or views by the government).  
Furthermore, the dissent believed that any member may express his views freely in any 
private or public forum before the union collected his dues, which was contrary to the 
majority opinion of coerced speech.  Street, 367 U.S. at 806. 
79 See Street, 367 U.S. at 768 (examining that funds cannot be used for purposes outside the 
expenses of negotiation).  The NLRB requires unions to inform every employee of the 
opportunity to become non-members.  See How Do I Cut Off the Use of My Dues for Politics and 
Other Nonbargaining Activities?, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. FOUND., 
http://www.nrtw.org/a/a_4_p.htm [http://perma.cc/YDF7-3ZCL] (composing a list of 
requirements that unions must furnish to all employees).  In addition, information must be 
provided that states non-members have the option to opt out of paying for dues not central 
to the union’s duties.  Id.  Furthermore, unions must provide sufficient information allowing 
the non-member to make an intelligible decision.  Id.  Moreover, unions must tell the 
employees about the procedures of filing objections with the union.  Id.  If a non-member 
does object to the political expenditures, then the union must provide a calculation of the 
deduction, which the non-member can challenge at a later date.  Id. 
80 See infra Part II.C (analyzing the right to impose agency fees on public employees). 
81 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 211–12 (1977) (establishing the Detroit 
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required every teacher who was a non-member of the union to pay the 
same service charge and regular dues as a union member.82  A group of 
teachers sued, alleging that they opposed the union’s use of collective 
bargaining in the public-sector due to their funds being used for the 
union’s engagement in religious, professional, scientific, political, and 
economic programs.83 
The Court reasoned that agency shop provisions were linked with the 
principle of exclusive representation.84  Exclusive representation 
promoted labor peace because it prevented inter-union rivalries among 
the work force.85  The concept was that one representative entity was 
                                                 
Federation of Teachers as the exclusive representative for teachers in 1967).  The collective 
bargaining agreement was effective between the dates July 1, 1969, to July 1, 1971.  Id. at 212. 
82 See id. (examining the agency shop clause requirement that required every teacher who 
was a non-member of the representative union to pay a service charge equal in amount to 
the full-fledged union members). 
83 See id. at 212–13 (reflecting that a substantial sum of the payments was used for activities 
other than for limiting bargaining agent costs). 
84 See id. at 220 (stating that a central element in industrial relations is exclusive union 
representation).  In Abood, the Court reasoned that the holdings in Hanson and Street would 
go far toward resolving the First Amendment issue.  See id. at 217 (beginning with Hanson 
and Street to determine whether an agency shop provision within a collective bargaining 
agreement can be considered constitutionally valid).  The Court recognized that Street did 
not reach any of the constitutional issues.  See Abood, 431 U.S. at 219–20 (interpreting that 
Hanson failed to answer important constitutional questions that need to be solved in the 
current case).  The Court dismissed the teachers’ argument because the interference was 
constitutionally justified due to the union shop being of substantial importance to the labor 
relations system.  See id. (acknowledging that the judgment made in Hanson and Street made 
the interference constitutionally justified). 
85 See id. at 220 (recognizing the benefits of having only one union, rather than many).  In 
addition, the Court recognized that requiring employees to financially support unions has a 
direct impact on First Amendment rights.  See id. at 222 (clarifying that employee First 
Amendment interests are impacted when the employee is compelled to financially support 
a union).  The Court gave the following as examples of potential impacts on the First 
Amendment interests of the employees: 
An employee may very well have ideological objections to a wide 
variety of activities undertaken by the union in its role as exclusive 
representative.  His moral or religious views about the desirability of 
abortion may not square with the union’s policy in negotiating a 
medical benefits plan.  One individual might disagree with a union 
policy of negotiating limits on the right to strike, believing that to be the 
road to serfdom for the working class, while another might have 
economic or political objections to unionism itself.  An employee might 
object to the union’s wage policy because it violates guidelines designed 
to limit inflation, or might object to the union’s seeking a clause in the 
collective-bargaining agreement proscribing racial discrimination. 
Id.  The primary reason for the union shop agreements was to solve the problems of free 
riding from non-members and to promote labor peace.  See id. at 260 (explaining that the 
agency shop reduces the risk of free riders among non-union employees by fairly 
distributing the costs for exclusive representation and promoting labor peace among public 
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better than two because the employers would not have to worry about 
establishing different terms, thus making the system more efficient.86  In 
addition, the union, acting as an exclusive representative of the 
employees, frees the employer from facing conflicting demands from 
multiple unions, and avoids attacks from rival labor unions.87 
When addressing the free rider issue, Abood noted that unions must 
represent all employees, including union and non-union members.88  This 
amount of responsibility and difficulty of exclusive representation 
requires a lot of time and money, which makes free riding on benefits an 
issue for unions in continuing to successfully represent employees.89  The 
union shop arrangement distributed the costs amongst the employees that 
benefit from services and reducing the incentive to then take advantage of 
the free benefits.90 
The appellants in Abood argued that Hanson and Street should not be 
followed because they dealt with unions in the private sector, rather than 
                                                 
employees). 
86 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 220 (imposing a single representative is more efficient and creates 
less confusion than enforcing multiple union agreements with varying conditions and 
terms).  This philosophy was created over the disgust for independent unions before the 
passage of the NLRA.  See Rabban, supra note 40, at 693 (demonstrating the purpose behind 
exclusive union representation). 
87 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 221 (examining the benefits of having only one union); see also 
Rabban, supra note 40, at 693 (mentioning that unions promote efficiency within the 
workforce by being the only representative for all employees). 
88 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 221 (finding that unions must fairly and equitably represent every 
employee in carrying out its duties).  To overcome the free rider issue, the Court allowed 
union compulsion through the use of union security agreements.  See Benjamin I. Sachs, 
Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 
800, 815 (2012) (discussing that unions can compel employees to financially support unions 
to combat the free rider issue). 
89 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 221 (stating that representing the interests of the employees is 
difficult and requires a lot of time and money).  Unions claim that they spend a majority of 
the compelled dues for representation, contract negotiations, or non-political work.  See 
Jarrett Skorup, The Union “Free-Rider Problem” Myth in Right-to-Work Debate, CAPCON (Dec. 
10, 2012), http://www.michigancapitolconfidential.com/18017 [http://perma.cc/L79N-
W5JS] (exploring Michigan’s evolution as a right to work state).  According to union 
documents, activities classified as representational totaled eleven percent of the union’s 
expenditures.  Id.  Another argument along with the free rider issue is that nobody is required 
to be in a union.  Id.  The distinction comes down to not whether someone is required to be 
in a union, but that they are compelled to pay association fees that can represent up to ninety 
percent of the full member dues.  Id. 
90 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 222 (describing the union shop agreement as counteracting the 
incentive to obtain the benefits for free).  Unions spent over $4.4 billion on electing political 
candidates, and twelve of the top twenty political donors were unions.  See Skorup, supra 
note 89 (inquiring into the substantial amount of funds used toward politics).  There is a 
discrepancy with the placement of political funds with three percent of total political 
expenditures going towards the Republican Party, even though forty percent of union 
members vote for the Republican Party.  Id. 
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the public sector, which would require an alternate result.91  The Court 
noted that even though private and public employers seek to keep costs 
down, the public employers lack the ability to oppose increases in labor 
costs that can be dealt with in the private-sector through adjustments in 
an established market.92  In addition, the Court noted that public 
employers are responsible to the electorate, comprising of government 
employees, taxpayers, and users of government services.93  Given the 
opportunity for the government representatives to agree with the union’s 
demands, the Court reasoned that public employees have more of an 
impact in the decision-making process compared to employees in the 
private-sector.94  Even with these differences, the Court held that the 
collective bargaining differences between the private and public-sector do 
not equate with differences in First Amendment rights.95 
                                                 
91 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 227–28 (noting that an alternative conclusion must be reached 
under the Constitution because collective bargaining by public sector unions is inherently 
political). 
92 See id. (stating that concerns over decreases in employment and costly wage demands 
are less of a concern for public-sector unions).  In Michigan, unions represented roughly 
38,500 state employees in 2008 and received around $450.00 per employee.  See Paul Kersey, 
News Release:  State Government Paid $17.6 Million to Unions in 2008, According to Documents 
Secured by FOIA Request, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y, http://www.mackinac.org/10326 
[http://perma.cc/57EA-MRQY] (analyzing the millions of dollars in agency fees to unions).  
One of the problems with the unions is accounting for their spending.  Id.  Less than half of 
the union costs went to employee representation, and over ten percent accounted for political 
spending.  Id. 
93 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 228 (explaining that the decision-making process by the public 
employer is inherently a political process); see also Tom Gantert, Early Returns on Michigan as 
a Right-to-Work State:  Incomes Rising, CAPCON (July 25, 2014), http://www.michigancapitol 
confidential.com/20319 [http://perma.cc/9PY7-BNNG] (recognizing that educational 
attainment explains the variances in state incomes). 
94 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 229 (explaining the argument that public employees are in a better 
position to make an impact in the decision-making process).  Even though public employees 
could make more of an impact within the decision-making process, the public-sector union 
memberships still decline similar to the private sector.  See Craig Becker, The Pattern of Union 
Decline, Economic and Political Consequences, and the Puzzle of a Legislative Response, 98 MINN. 
L. REV. 1637, 1639 (2014) (acknowledging the downward trend in union memberships, both 
in the private and public-sector).  The recession and changes in public-sector employee rights 
contributed to the decline of union membership.  Id. 
95 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 232 (reiterating that the First Amendment rights are the same in 
collective bargaining issues for both the public and private sector).  The public-sector unions 
are political because the government pays the wages and benefits of its members, with 
lobbying being the sole advocacy system to raise compensation.  See Steven Greenhouse, 
Supreme Court Ruling on Union Fee Is a Limited Blow to Labor, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/business/supreme-court-ruling-on-public-
workers-and-union-fees.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/J6V8-MU7X] (examining the effect on 
the treasuries and memberships of the unions). 
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D. Harris v. Quinn 
In Illinois, Section 676.10 of the Illinois Administrative Code 
establishes an employee-employer relationship between the personal 
assistant and the person receiving the care.96  The personal assistant in this 
context encompasses individuals employed by a client to provide a variety 
of services approved by a physician.97  In this situation, the customer 
controls the employment relationship between the personal assistant and 
the customer.98  Even though the customer controls the employment 
                                                 
96 See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2623 (2014) (discussing that the personal assistant’s 
employer is the person receiving the home care).  This relationship is important in the context 
of Harris because the unions have less of a need to step in to represent employees that do not 
interact with each other.  See GERALD MAYER, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 17 (2004) (finding that focusing more on employees’ concerns increased job 
satisfaction of non-members of the union, including the personal assistants).  Illinois was one 
of the first states to establish the Medicaid funds program and created the Illinois 
Department of Human Services Home Services Program, known as the Rehabilitation 
Program.  See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2623 (summarizing the factual background before the 
Court).  The Rehabilitation Program provides homecare services for individual needs.  Id. at 
2624.  Medicaid funds programs that offer in-home services to people that would normally 
need institutionalization, such as requiring transfer to a nursing home.  Id. at 2623.  The 
following code establishes the offered program: 
The Secretary may by waiver provide that a State plan approved under 
this subchapter may include as “medical assistance’” under such plan 
payment for part or all of the cost of home or community-based services 
(other than room and board) approved by the Secretary which are 
provided pursuant to a written plan of care to individuals with respect 
to whom there has been a determination that but for the provision of 
such services the individuals would require the level of care provided 
in a hospital or a nursing facility or intermediate care facility for the 
mentally retarded the cost of which could be reimbursed under the State 
plan. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(1) (2012).  Up until this was permitted, personal assistants were not 
considered state employees.  See Jacob Huebert, Harris v. Quinn:  A Win for Freedom of 
Association, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 195, 196 (2013–14) (stating that personal assistants were not 
considered public employees until the recognition of the Rehabilitation Program).  The 
designation of personal assistants as state employees may not have been a big deal for 
unionization because the employers adapted to meet the employees’ concerns.  See Amanda 
McHenry, Comment, The NLRB Wields Its Rulemaking Authority:  The New Face of 
Representation Elections, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 589, 601 (2011) (acknowledging work 
satisfaction increased and unionization decreased). 
97 See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 676.30(p) (2014) (authorizing the personal assistants to 
help elderly people with home care services); see also Keith Kelleher, Harris v. Quinn:  Another 
Nail in the Coffin or Shot in the Arm for Labor?, http://progressillinois.com/quick-
hits/content/2014/09/01/harris-v-quinn-another-nail-coffin-or-shot-arm-labor 
[http://perma.cc/DLD4-DEHZ] (admitting that the Service Employees International Union 
(“SEIU”) effectively collectively bargained for increased wages immediately following the 
decision in Harris). 
98 See ILL. ADMIN CODE tit. 89, § 676.30(b) (authorizing the customers to have control over 
the business relationship); see also Ronald J. Kramer & Joshua L. Ditelberg, Harris v. Quinn:  
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relationship, the State, through Medicaid subsidizations, pays the 
personal assistant salaries.99  Other than payment of the salaries, the 
State’s involvement is limited.100 
In Harris, three personal assistants (“petitioners”) filed a complaint on 
behalf of all Rehabilitation Program personal assistants seeking an 
injunction against implementing the fair-share provision, and to hold the 
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (“PLRA”) in violation of the First 
Amendment for requiring personal assistants to pay fees to a union with 
opposing views.101  The District Court dismissed the claim and the 
Seventh Circuit determined that they were employees of the State.102  The 
                                                 
Roadmap for the End of Fair Share?, LAW360 (June 30, 2014), http://www.law360.com/ 
articles/553168/harris-v-quinn-roadmap-for-the-end-of-fair-share [http://perma.cc/F8QF-
7THQ] (recognizing the regulation designated the employer as the customer for the personal 
assistants).  The customer who received the care controlled nearly all aspects of the 
employment relationship.  See Kramer & Ditelberg, supra note 98 (furthering the proposition 
that the personal assistants were not in charge of the employment relationship). 
99 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2626 (acknowledging that the payment comes from the non-
union member personal assistants). 
100 See id. (explaining that the State’s involvement primarily deals with compensation, but 
the rest is minimal).  In March 2003, Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich, issued an executive 
order recognizing the SEIU as the personal assistants’ exclusive representative for collective 
bargaining purposes with the State.  See id. (describing the executive order as circumventing 
the Illinois Labor Relations Board decision).  This order provided personal assistants with 
the opportunity to voice any concerns about their jobs to help “efficiently and effectively 
deliver home services.”  See id. (detailing the concern with the personal assistant’s lack of 
structure to voice any concerns).  Once the Act was codified, personal assistants were 
considered public employees of Illinois and covered under the PLRA.  See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
2405/3(f) (2014) (stating that the personal assistants were public employees only for 
purposes of coverage).  After the implementation of the statute, SEIU and Illinois agreed over 
collective bargaining agreements requiring all personal assistants that are non-union 
members to pay a reduced rate in dues, also referred to as a fair share rate.  See Harris, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2626 (identifying that non-membership dues would be deducted from the Medicaid 
payments to the personal assistants). 
101 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2626 (recognizing the case before the Court as dealing with three 
personal assistants under the Rehabilitation Program).  The PLRA permits state employees 
to become members of labor unions and bargain collectively over the conditions and terms 
of employment.  See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6(a) (2014) (authorizing the state employees to 
join unions).  The PLRA has an agency fee provision requiring non-members of the union to 
pay a union fee.  See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2625 (examining the agency fee provision and its 
effect on non-members).  The PLRA considers this a “fair share” provision, which states the 
following: 
When a collective bargaining agreement is entered into with an 
exclusive representative, it may include in the agreement a provision 
requiring employees covered by the agreement who are not members of 
the organization to pay their proportionate share of the costs of the 
collective-bargaining process, contract administration and pursuing 
matters affecting wages, hours and conditions of employment . . . . 
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6(e).  Ultimately, the fair share provision is taken out of the non-
member employee salaries and paid to the union.  See id. (discussing the requirement that 
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Supreme Court granted certiorari when other states classified personal 
assistants as state employees, which raised important First Amendment 
questions.103 
The Court in Harris reaffirmed the belief that Abood is “somewhat of 
an anomaly” and directed the focus to Abood as the precedent to 
analyze.104  Illinois sought to extend the ruling of Abood to include full-
fledged public employees and quasi-public employees to collect an agency 
fee from personal assistants.105  Unlike the characteristics of full-fledged 
                                                 
unions must certify with the employer that each non-member proportionate share amount 
that cannot exceed the regular membership dues). 
102 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2627 (holding that State employees are personal assistants within 
Abood because the customers and Illinois are considered joint employers of the personal 
assistants). 
103 See id. (noting an Illinois law that defines home healthcare workers as public employees, 
including licensed practical nurses, registered nurses, and private therapists).  Not only has 
the Court stepped in to solve the issue, but Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner issued an 
executive order giving employees the option to opt out of fair share agreements.  See Paul 
Meincke, Rauner Eliminates “Fair Share” Union Dues for State Workers, ABC 7 (Feb. 09, 2015), 
http://abc7chicago.com/politics/rauner-eliminates-fair-share-union-dues-for-state-
workers/510528/ [http://perma.cc/YDR5-7KAV] (reflecting on the new executive order 
issued to eliminate fair share union dues).  The Governor declared the agency fee system as 
neither legal, nor fair, and moved to put an end to fair share agreements.  Id. 
104 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2627 (citing Knox, which explains that the free-rider arguments 
are not enough to overcome the First Amendment objections).  The Court in Harris further 
discredited Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association for personal assistants.  See id. at 2636 (rejecting 
Lehnert’s reasoning); Lehnert, 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991) (concluding that a union cannot 
discriminate between non-members and members in administering and negotiating a 
collective bargaining agreement).  The Court stressed that the union could not sacrifice 
higher pay because of statutory requirements specifying the hourly pay rate for personal 
assistants.  See Harris, 134 U.S. at 2637 (detailing that unions should not have to give up 
higher membership pay for non-member protection).  Furthermore, the Court noted that 
customers have complete control over the personal assistant’s work, which eliminated the 
union’s authority over grievances with personal assistants.  See id. (explaining that the 
union’s authority over the personal assistant employment is virtually non-existent).  The 
main difference the Court recognized was that the grievance procedure for personal 
assistants should deal directly with the customer, not with the State.  See id. (acknowledging 
that in regard to personal assistants, the union’s purpose was for grievances with the state, 
rather than for the client). 
105 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2627 (arguing that the expansion should include public 
employees for unionization).  The Court noted that with respect to full-fledged public 
employees, the State establishes all of the duties for each employee and qualifications for 
each position.  Id. at 2634.  The following includes other functions that are characteristics of 
full-fledged public employees: 
The State vets applicants and chooses the employees to be hired.  The 
State provides or arranges for whatever training is needed, and it 
supervises and evaluates the employees’ job performance and imposes 
corrective measures if appropriate.  If a state employee’s performance is 
deficient, the State may discharge the employee in accordance with 
whatever procedures are required by law. 
Id. 
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public employees, personal assistants are employees of the customers.106  
For that reason, the Court recognized that Abood was not controlling, 
therefore, the analysis shifted to whether the compelled payments were 
constitutional under First Amendment standards.107  After analyzing the 
constitutionality of the payments, the Court recognized that the agency 
fee provision in this case is not commercial speech, which would make the 
standard too permissive.108 
The Court recognized that there was no link between the right to 
receive an agency fee from non-members and the exclusive bargaining 
agent status of the union.109  In addition, the agency fee system in Harris 
did not play a significant role in preserving labor peace because the 
employees did not interact with each other.110  The Court then addressed 
whether the agency fee provision promoted the welfare of personal 
assistants.111  Harris held that the agency fee provision could not be 
                                                 
106 See id. (describing the State as having no provision to check in on the personal assistants 
during the job performance).  Illinois withholds most of the rights and benefits from personal 
assistants that are used by full-fledged state employees.  Id. at 2634–35. 
107 See id. at 2639 (examining the constitutionality of the compelled payments of non-
members of public-sector unions).  In evaluating the agency shop agreement, the Court 
looked at United States v. United Foods, Inc. within the analysis of Knox v. SEIU, where a 
provision that required the subsidization of commercial speech was struck down.  See Harris, 
134 S. Ct. at 2639 (acknowledging the compelled speech in Knox as different than its 
precedent, but still capable of stirring the passions of many); see also Knox v. SEIU, Local 
1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2296 (2012) (stating that individuals should not be forced to subsidize 
private speech). 
108 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2639 (expressing that the speech in the case extends beyond 
commercial speech that only proposes a commercial transaction).  In addition, the provision 
did not complete the compelling state interest test under strict scrutiny.  See Knox, 132 S. Ct. 
at 2289 (explaining the free rider arguments as insufficient to defeat First Amendment 
objections). 
109 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2640 (“For example, employees in some federal agencies may 
choose a union to serve as the exclusive bargaining agent for the unit, but no employee is 
required to join the union or to pay any union fee.”).  The link is in accordance with federal 
law that gives the employee the right to form, join, or refrain from a labor organization 
without penalty.  See 5 U.S.C. § 7102 (2012) (establishing the employees’ right to organize). 
110 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2640 (recognizing the argument that agency fees play an 
important role as undermined by the Illinois scheme).  The Court realized that personal 
assistants work in the customers’ home, not in a common state facility, which diminished 
any threat to labor peace.  See id. (reiterating that a lack of a common state facility diminished 
the concern over a conflict of labor peace).  Congress affirmed this theory by giving 
employees in domestic service the right to opt out of coverage.  See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012) 
(excluding individuals employed with the domestic service of families or personal homes). 
111 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2640 (determining the success between the Rehabilitation 
Program and the agency fee provision).  Respondents claimed that the benefits and wages 
improved, along with procedures to resolve grievances.  See id. at 2640–41 (arguing that the 
benefits of the union through training programs and grievance procedures makes collective 
bargaining necessary for the sector). 
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sustained because the benefits provided from the unions could have been 
achieved through voluntary contributions.112 
Harris rejected Illinois’ argument to extend Abood and allow unions to 
collect agency fees from non-members.113  The Court stressed that 
adhering to Illinois’ argument would be an unprecedented violation of the 
principle providing no person can be compelled to support speech by a 
third party that he or she has no interest in supporting.114  The Court held 
that the First Amendment forbids collecting agency fees from personal 
                                                 
112 See id. at 2641 (acknowledging that the agency fee provision should be allowed only if 
the benefits could not be obtained without the fees paid by the personal assistants to join the 
union); see also Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 877 (1961) (mandating that lawyers have 
the same protection provided in the RLA for railroad workers).  The Respondents urged the 
Court to apply and balance the Pickering test with the agency fee.  See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 
2641 (seeking to find a new justification for Abood’s decision).  The Court began by dismissing 
the argument because the State and personal assistants were not in their traditional roles.  Id. 
at 2642.  The reasoning behind the decision stems from the Pickering case, stating that speech 
regarding public concern can be restricted if the interest of the state in promoting the public 
services executed through its employees outweighs the employees’ interest in being able to 
comment on issues concerning the public.  Id.  The Court recognized that Medicaid funding 
would be a matter of great public concern, which required the Court to proceed to the next 
test.  Id. at 2642–43.  The next test measured the interference with the First Amendment 
compared to the degree the agency fee promoted efficiency for the Rehabilitation Program.  
Id. at 2643.  The Court noted that agency fees impose a heavy burden on the objecting 
employees’ First Amendment rights.  See id. (asserting that the objecting employee First 
Amendment rights have a heavy burden when agency fee provisions are imposed); see also 
John Eastman, Harris v. Quinn Symposium:  Abood and the Walking Dead, SCOTUSBLOG (June 
30, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/harris-v-quinn-symposium-abood-and-
the-walking-dead/ [http://perma.cc/SS2D-T379] (recognizing that the heart of the 
arguments used to uphold compulsory union fees could no longer stand).  The Court 
finalized the issue by holding that the provision could not be upheld as analyzed under 
Pickering.  Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2643. 
113 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2644 (refusing to extend Abood consistent with Illinois’ 
arguments).  The Freedom Foundation is suing SEIU 925 and Washington State for family 
home-care providers that are being forced to pay union dues.  See Jim Brunner, Labor Law 
Challenged:  Freedom Foundation Sues SEIU 925, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 6, 2015), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/freedom-foundation-files-suit-
against-seiu-925/ [http://perma.cc/83B4-6DPA] (stating that ruling in Freedom 
Foundation’s favor will give all public workers the right to associate with any organization). 
114 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2644 (“[E]xcept perhaps in the rarest of circumstances, no person 
in this country may be compelled to subsidize speech by a third party that he or she does not 
wish to support.”); see also Bureau of Int’l Lab. Aff., Freedom of Association & Collective 
Bargaining, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/ilab/issues/foa-cb/ 
[http://perma.cc/DQA8-2X36] (discussing the importance of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining).  California public school teachers are also arguing to opt out of agency 
fees.  See Deborah J. LaFetra, Rescuing Teachers from the Grasp of Forced Unionism, PLF LIBERTY 
BLOG (Feb. 26, 2015), http://blog.pacificlegal.org/2015/rescuing-teachers-grasp-forced-
unionism/ [http://perma.cc/47XX-N4BE] (noting that the public school teachers believe the 
time is right to review the garnishment of paychecks by unions to protect their freedom of 
association). 
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assistants in the Rehabilitation program who do not wish to support the 
union.115  While partially abandoning the Abood standard, Harris reversed 
the judgment in part and affirmed in part.116 
E. Fundamentals of the Freedom of Association 
The First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right to freedom of 
association for individuals.117  As early as 1958, the Court noted that the 
freedom to engage in associations to advance ideas and beliefs is inherent 
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.118  In addition, 
freedom of association is a fundamental part of a free society, similar to 
                                                 
115  See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2644 (prohibiting agency fees from personal assistants in the 
Rehabilitation program).  However, other people believe the inclusion of a ban on the union’s 
ability to charge agency fees will decrease the union membership and could make the right 
of workers to organize obsolete.  See Mirer, supra note 59, at 38 (analyzing that unions seek 
to protect, rather than harm, the interests of union members).  The current trend for public 
employees is voting against unionization to avoid having non-members essentially waive 
their freedom of association.  See Bruce Parker, Vermont’s Child Care Providers to Remain Non-
Unionized, VERMONTWATHCDOG.ORG (Mar. 3, 2015), http://watchdog.org/203206/ 
unionized-childcare-vermont/ [http://perma.cc/VN3B-A8MF] (recognizing that Vermont 
child care providers should not have to be under the union representation if they choose to 
be non-members of a representative union). 
116 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2644 (reversing the Court of Appeals judgment in part and 
affirming in part).  Even though the Court acknowledged the First Amendment concerns that 
arise over government coercion through agency fees, the ruling was still considered a 
devastating blow to public-sector unions.  See Tom McCarthy & Samuel B. Gedge, Harris v. 
Quinn Symposium:  A Quiet Blockbuster?, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/ 
07/harris-v-quinn-symposium-a-quiet-blockbuster/#more-214791 [http://perma.cc/Z44J-
F4BU] (discussing the arguments for the support of the agency fee). 
117 See Huebert, supra note 96, at 201 (identifying that previous Supreme Court holdings 
have protected the right to freedom of association under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments); see also Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 309–11 (1986) 
(holding that the teacher’s union could not collect agency fees from non-members in 
accordance with the Constitution).  The use of an auditor was considered overly broad to 
determine the accurateness of the expenditures.  See Andrews v. Educ. Ass’n of Cheshire, 
829 F.2d 335, 340 (2d Cir. 1987) (utilizing the auditor as an independent decision maker and 
in the traditional sense makes the scope of employment too vague).  In determining the 
accurateness of the expenditures, absolute precision on behalf of the auditor is not necessary 
for public-sector unions.  See Am. Fed’n of Television & Recording Artists, Portland Local, 
327 N.L.R.B. 474, 477 (1999) (recognizing that all that is needed for the determination of the 
expenditure accurateness is just a verification that the expenses were made). 
118 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (explaining that the Fourteenth 
Amendment embraces free speech, including the right to advance economic, cultural, 
religious, or political matters); Donata Marcantonio, Knox v. Service Employees 
International Union:  Balancing the First Amendment with Fairness Under Union-Shop 
Agreements, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 211, 211 (2012) (examining the need for 
speech regulations to be minimally restrictive for analysis under the First Amendment); 
Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1, 743 F.2d 1187, 1193 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(expressing that federal statutes require safeguards for non-members of unions). 
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that of free speech.119  Furthermore, freedom of association assumes a 
freedom not to associate with a public union.120 
As previously shown, the Court acknowledged that serious risks are 
imposed on the government when employees are required to pay 
subsidies for speech by recognizing the Court’s ability to completely 
prevent the compelled speech.121  The Court held that if the contributions 
are used to support political or ideological causes that the employee 
opposes, then the employers’ First Amendment rights are impinged, 
regardless of the time or money spent for such purposes.122  In addition, a 
mode of business that requires an employee to support a certain political 
party violates his or her First Amendment right.123  Freedom of association 
                                                 
119 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (acknowledging the State’s burden of 
demonstrating a sufficiently important interest and closely drawn means to violating the 
freedom of association).  A likely challenge the opposition would raise to the First 
Amendment challenge for implementing the proposed statute is stare decisis, but the 
argument is unlikely to work.  Huebert, supra note 96, at 219.  The majority in Citizens United 
v. FEC states that the Court will overrule decisions that offend the First Amendment while 
overruling a twenty-year old precedent.  See 558 U.S. 310, 363 (2010) (highlighting that the 
Court will overrule a precedent if the decision was offensive to the First Amendment).  
Several factors were identified by the Court in Citizens United when considering whether to 
overturn a precedent:  (1) “whether the decision was well reasoned;” (2) “the reliance 
interests at stake;” (3) “the antiquity of the precedent;” and (4) the shortcomings of the 
precedent.  Id.  The Court in Harris held that the experience over the course of history pointed 
to Abood’s shortcomings.  See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2633 (referring to the practical problems of 
non-members who object and the abundant administrative problems with union 
expenditures). 
120 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (emphasis added) (acknowledging 
that freedom of association allows people to be a member of any organization); see also Gary 
Pecquet, Private Property and Government Under the Constitution, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. 
(Jan. 1, 1995), http://fee.org/freeman/detail/private-property-and-government-under-the-
constitution [http://perma.cc/3DYZ-M7G4] (weighing the economic concerns of the 
individual liberties that are protected by the Constitution). 
121 See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410–11 (2001) (recognizing the risks 
inherent with compelled subsidies of speech).  Even if employees that are non-members 
continue working after being compelled to pay agency fees, the continuation of employment 
does not mean that non-members waived their constitutional right to freely associate with 
any organization.  See College Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999) (comparing the effective waiver of constitutional rights with 
being compelled to give up a fundamental right).  In addition, unions can avoid subsidizing 
speech by becoming members-only organizations if they elect to not become the exclusive 
bargaining agent of an industry.  See Zoeller v. Sweeney, 19 N.E.3d 749, 753 (Ind. 2014) 
(justifying that unions are justly compensated by the right of being the exclusive bargaining 
agent). 
122 See Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 305 (1986) (reasoning that the 
concern is not diminished based on each individual amount at stake); see also Elrod v. Burns, 
427 U.S. 347, 359 n.13 (1976) (evaluating that rights are infringed both when the government 
withholds or fines a grant of money based upon the political party of the individual). 
123 See Elrod, 427 U.S. 347, 355 (1976) (discussing the freedoms of association and belief).  In 
addition, there is a right to be free from any unwanted government intrusions that impede 
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plays a significant role in the analysis of Harris, leading to the needed 
amendment of the Employees’ Rights statute.124 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The majority’s treatment of Abood suggests that the Justices will 
overrule the case in the future.125  The good thing is the employers’ rights 
will be protected once the court rules in their favor; the bad thing is there 
is no way of knowing when another case with the perfect fact scenario will 
reach the Court.  First, Part III.A analyzes the freedom of association and 
its importance in society.126  Then, Part III.B examines the error in analysis 
and reasoning behind Abood, and why Congress should step in and give 
all public employees the right to refuse agency fees.127  Next, Part III.C 
reviews the uncertainty of Abood’s ruling, which gives more credit to 
Congress amending the employees’ rights statute to eliminate the Abood 
standard.128  Next, Part III.D analyzes the impact Harris v Quinn will have 
in the short and long term.129  Finally, Part III.E examines the future 
ramifications of the decision.130 
A. Importance of Freedom of Association 
The analysis in Abood suggests that public-sector unions can compel 
an employee to pay an agency fee, but this was suspect over time with the 
development of case law.131  To uphold the unions’ measures of charging 
                                                 
on a person’s privacy.  See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (introducing the right 
of freedom of association as one that the framers of the Constitution sought to protect the 
pursuit of happiness). 
124 See infra Part IV (discussing the proposed statute to move the right to opt out of agency 
fees from quasi-public employees to all public employees due to the inconsistencies of the 
Supreme Court cases). 
125 See Huebert, supra note 96, at 219 (inferring the majority is ready to overturn Abood 
based on the evisceration of its reasoning in Harris). 
126 See infra Part III.A (examining the agency fee with the freedom of association). 
127 See infra Part III.B (discussing the errors in the analysis of Abood with regard to a 
misapplication of two cases). 
128 See infra Part III.C (describing why the Court was unable to make the decision to 
overturn Abood in Harris). 
129 See infra Part III.D (observing the short term and long term impacts the case will have 
on unions and the public sector). 
130 See infra Part III.E (exploring the impact this decision will have on public-sector jobs). 
131 See Knox v. Serv. Emps., 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2290 (2012) (acknowledging an anomaly exists 
with the free rider argument in justifying compelling non-members to pay a reduced amount 
of union dues).  Abood treated Hanson and Street as if they had resolved the First Amendment 
infringement issue when the government coerces union support.  See Huebert, supra note 96, 
at 205 (stating that Abood never solved the First Amendment issues). 
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members, the charge must serve a compelling interest.132  However, 
permitting public unions to collect fees from non-members crosses the 
limits of the First Amendment.133  When balancing the state and individual 
interests together, the First Amendment weighs largely in favor of 
individual rights.134  The framers of the U.S. Constitution intended our 
rights to be free from governmental force, which separates our nation 
from others.135 
The constitutional right to freedom of association inherently gives an 
individual the option to not associate with an organization.136  For 
instance, if an employee wants to join an organization, he may do so, but 
if his personal beliefs contradict the organization’s beliefs, then he may 
opt out of a membership and forgo any dues associated with the 
process.137  Continuing to allow unions to force public employees to pay 
agency fees would violate the long recognized rule that public employees 
have the right to refuse payment of dues to unions that are contrary to 
their own political beliefs.138  The Employees’ Rights statute needs to be 
                                                 
132 See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2291 (recognizing that the procedure incorporated by the union 
is required to satisfy a high standard).  The union in Harris had to prove the agency fee served 
a compelling interest.  See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014) (holding that the 
agency fee did not fulfill the compelling state interest requirement). 
133 See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2291 (“By authorizing a union to collect fees from non[-]members 
and permitting the use of an opt-out system for the collection of fees levied to cover non[-
]chargeable expenses, our prior decisions approach, if they do not cross, the limit of what the 
First Amendment can tolerate.”). 
134 See Marcantonio, supra note 118, at 211 (establishing that the speech restrictions must 
be minimally restrictive to abide by the First Amendment).  The Court weighed in favor of 
individual First Amendment interests under strict scrutiny review.  Id. at 226. 
135 See Pecquet, supra note 120 (highlighting the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, 
and the right to assembly as rights exercised against the government).  All the rights not 
specifically given to the government remain with the citizens.  Id. 
136 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (interpreting the freedom of 
association as providing the opportunity to not associate).  First Amendment concerns are 
raised when an individual is compelled to support an organization that is against his own 
beliefs.  Id.; see Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1, 743 F.2d 1187, 1193 (7th Cir. 
1984) (analyzing that a state cannot deprive a person of his freedom of association by 
compelling him to financially support a union). 
137 See McCarthy & Gedge, supra note 116 (describing that hundreds of thousands of 
personal assistants within the home caregiver market will be free to cease payments for 
union memberships).  The personal assistants in Harris are now able to keep the agency fee 
amount in their own pockets.  Id. 
138 See Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 302 n.9 (1986) 
(discussing the right of public employees to refuse compulsory dues); Elrod v. Burns, 427 
U.S. 347, 357 (1976) (asserting that orderly group activity must be considered with the 
freedom to associate in the advancement of political beliefs).  As a fundamental right, public 
employees should be free to make their own decisions.  Elrod, 427 U.S. at 357.  The concept 
is that the state should not coerce the public employee into its own beliefs, but should allow 
the public employees the freedom to form their own beliefs.  Id.; see also Stanley v. Georgia, 
394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (inferring that the power of the government to control men’s minds 
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amended to put a halt to the continued deprivation of the non-member’s 
freedom of association.139 
The Court does not “presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental 
rights.”140  This statement suggests that public workers do not presumably 
acquiesce to losing their freedom of association through silence or 
action.141  The union supporters argue for the continued implementation 
of the agency fee because the agency fee produces labor equality in 
bargaining power for the employees and eliminates the free rider 
problem.142  The agency fee makes unions capable of supporting all public 
employees without producing an undue burden of representing a group 
of people for free.143  The contention that the agency fee prevents free 
riders misses the key issue that all public employees have the right to 
freely choose who they want to be associated with and support.144  Harris 
mentions that freedom of association is a fundamental right and should 
be treated as such.145 
                                                 
would make our constitutional heritage rebel). 
139 See infra Part IV (proposing an amendment to the Employees’ Rights statute to give all 
public employees the right to opt out of agency fees). 
140 College Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
682 (1999).  The lack of acquiescence associated with the loss of the freedom of association is, 
to a lesser extent, comparable to racial discrimination.  Id.  If someone of a racial minority 
refused to speak up against discrimination in a public place, that does not mean he 
acquiesced to the discriminatory treatment.  Id.  Similarly with the public employee’s right 
to freely associate with an organization, an employee does not acquiesce to losing his 
freedom of association through silence and should not lose his job for failing to pay dues.  Id. 
141 See id. (providing the insight that courts presume people do not waive their 
fundamental constitutional rights).  In comparison, people that commit securities fraud 
would normally not waive their constitutional right of trial by jury.  Id.  In a similar matter, 
employees that are forced to pay fees to unions do not inherently waive their right of freedom 
of association.  College Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. at 682. 
142 See McCarthy & Gedge, supra note 116 (discussing the arguments for the support of the 
agency fee).  In addition, one belief suggests that the laws aimed at unions should be illegal 
in its entirety.  See Mirer, supra note 59, at 38 (articulating that the opposition believes the 
agency fee produces equality in bargaining power for employees). 
143 See Mirer, supra note 59, at 33 (discussing the negative impacts of free riders on the 
union membership system).  Unions stress that they need resources to cover the costs of 
collective bargaining.  Id.  In addition, unions believe that their bargaining power decreases 
with a lack of funds.  Id.  However, Harris recently ruled that First Amendment objections 
are generally sufficient to overcome free rider arguments.  See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 
2618, 2627 (2014) (pointing out that the free rider arguments under Abood are insufficient to 
overcome the First Amendment arguments). 
144 See Zoeller v. Sweeney, 19 N.E.3d 749, 753 (Ind. 2014) (explaining that the union’s 
requirement to represent every employee is optional and does not justify the use of an agency 
fee).  The requirement is optional because the union can opt to become a members-only 
union, thus eliminating the need to require just compensation of all employees.  Id. 
145 See Bureau of Int’l Lab. Aff., supra note 114 (articulating that the ability to organize is at 
the basis of freedom of association).  The Bureau of International Labor Affairs promotes 
freedom of association by enforcing labor rights within free trade agreements.  Id.  Union 
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B. Error in the Analysis of Abood 
The Court in Harris raised many errors within the analysis of Abood.146  
First, Abood never examined whether there was a compelling 
governmental interest with preserving labor peace and preventing free 
riding, which is why the Court relied upon Hanson and Street.147  The 
Court in Abood based its decisions on questionable grounds and did not 
foresee the practical problems associated with its decision.148  In particular, 
the Court incorrectly relied upon Hanson and Street, as these cases did not 
touch on the constitutional issue of compulsory payments to public-sector 
unions.149  Hanson disposed of the question in one sentence and Street 
ultimately did not make, or attempt to make, a constitutional decision.150  
This failure amounts to a serious error in the analysis of Abood and 
produces further questions with regard to the constitutionality of agency 
                                                 
members cannot be prevented from speaking out at a public meeting in opposition of the 
regulation because this is at the heart of the expansion of worker influence on the employers.  
Id. 
146 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632 (describing that Abood’s analysis was questionable in many 
ways). 
147 See Huebert, supra note 96, at 203 (stating that the Court did not examine how the 
dissenting employees could have their First Amendment rights protected).  The Court held 
that the government could compel public employees who were non-members to pay agency 
fees to cover the costs of collective bargaining.  Id.  At the time, the infringement was justified 
to prevent free riders from abusing the union’s representation services, and this would avoid 
the conflict and competition of rival unions within the same sector.  See Abood v. Detroit Bd. 
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 260–61 (1977) (highlighting the argument of requiring agency fees to 
combat confusion and conflict amongst the public employers). 
148 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2633 (holding that a major problem with the system is that 
auditors do not correct the categories of union expenditures); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 
500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991) (“[C]hargeable activities must (1) be ‘germane’ to collective-
bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the government’s vital policy interest in labor peace 
and avoiding ‘free riders’; and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that 
is inherent in the allowance of an agency or union shop.”).  Auditing the correctness of the 
union’s categorization of expenditures is problematic.  Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2633.  Auditors do 
not make legal determinations as to the correctness of chargeable expenditures.  Id.  Instead, 
the auditors only make sure that expenses were actually made.  Id.; see Andrews v. Educ. 
Ass’n of Cheshire, 829 F.2d 335, 340 (2d Cir. 1987) (ensuring that the payments the union 
claims it made for specific expenses were actually made for the listed expenses); Am. Fed’n 
of Television & Recording Artists, Portland Local, 327 N.L.R.B. 474, 477 (1999) (recognizing 
that auditors do not have the expertise to make legal findings determining the chargeability 
of certain expenditures). 
149 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632 (“The Abood Court seriously erred in treating Hanson and 
Street as having all but decided the constitutionality of compulsory payments to a public-
sector union.”). 
150 See id. at 2630 (noting that neither of the cases reached the constitutional issue); see also 
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961) (stating that the constitutional 
questions were of the utmost gravity, but the Court did not want to touch those issues); Ry. 
Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956) (comparing the requirement of joining a 
state bar association with compulsory membership dues imposed by unions). 
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fees and compulsory payments because all public employees would have 
been given the right to opt out of agency fees had Abood correctly 
interpreted Hanson and Street.151 
Second, Abood extended its authority beyond the interpretation that 
should have been implemented by imposing the agency fee, rather than 
authorizing the implementation of the agency fee.152  The closest Hanson 
came to supporting compulsory fees was a statement that, when 
compared to a state law requiring membership of an integrated bar, 
created no impairment or infringement of First Amendment rights.153  The 
Court expanded its reasoning in Abood because compulsory integrated bar 
memberships were never held to be constitutional before Hanson.154  Five 
years later, Justice Douglas, in Hanson, raised questions about his 
reasoning by changing his stance on furthering the protection of the First 
Amendment through prohibiting compulsory memberships for the 
integrated bar.155 
Third, Abood did not answer the constitutional questions concerning 
compulsory dues and freedom of association.156  Instead, the RLA was 
                                                 
151 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632 (suggesting that Abood did not decide the constitutionality 
of compulsory payments).  Abood’s treatment of Street and Hanson produced further 
questions in analysis.  Id. 
152 See id. (describing the imposition of the fee, rather than the authorization of the fee, as 
presenting a different type of question to the Court).  The fundamental misunderstanding 
was that Hanson declared the authorization of union shop agreements constitutional, rather 
than the imposition of union shop agreements.  Id. 
153 See id. at 2629 (acknowledging that lawyers can be compelled to become a member of 
an integrated bar).  In Hanson, the Court held that the RLA was constitutional in the 
authorization of union shop contracts.  See Street, 367 U.S. at 749 (applying the reasoning in 
Hanson to Street’s factual scenario); see also Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238 (holding that the 
requirement does not violate the First or Fifth Amendments). 
154 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2629 (explaining the reasoning as remarkable because the Court 
never addressed the constitutionality of compulsory membership dues to an integrated bar); 
see also Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238 (proposing the analogy of a lawyer joining the state bar 
association with unions compelling membership fees); Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient 
Markets:  Compelled Commercial Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, 
Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 565 (2006) (describing that Abood raised issues 
that could affect two First Amendment rights:  freedom of association and freedom of 
speech). 
155 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2629 (examining the inconsistencies of Justice Douglas’ 
reasoning).  The states compel lawyers to join the bar, but do not require a similar 
membership for dentists, nurses, or doctors.  See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 878 (1961) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that doctors, nurses, and dentists are excluded).  These 
groups protect the public and, along with other groups, increase the vital services across the 
nation.  Id.  Subsequently, Justice Douglas thought the analogy he used in Hanson failed 
because being partially regimented behind causes the lawyers oppose are not compatible 
with the First Amendment.  See id. at 878–84 (connecting the analogy between lawyers joining 
an integrated bar and an employee being compelled to join a union). 
156 See Street, 367 U.S. at 749 (determining that the Court should weigh against unnecessary 
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construed as not giving the unions unlimited power to spend compelled 
dues to support political causes that employees oppose.157  This is not to 
say that all public employees oppose union memberships, but those who 
do, should not be compelled to pay the agency fee associated with the 
union.158  However, the mere fact that Street did not make a constitutional 
decision raises questions about the foundation of Abood’s analysis by only 
addressing the power of unions to spend compelled dues, rather than the 
constitutionality of compelling non-members to make payments to 
organizations in opposition of their own views.159 
The arguments for the implementation of agency fees failed because 
the free rider arguments were not enough to overcome the First 
Amendment objections.160  Justice Alito reviewed the Court’s rulings on 
mandatory union fees before Harris.161  He created the following analogy 
for further review: 
                                                 
constitutional decisions if Congress made this intention clear in the statute).  The Court 
recognized the importance of the constitutional questions by phrasing them with the utmost 
gravity.  Id.; see also Paul Kulwinski, Trust in God Going Too Far:  Indiana’s “In God We Trust” 
License Plate Endorses Religion at Taxpayer Expense, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1317, 1365 (2009) 
(applying the Abood analysis for private speech when the government is forcing taxpayers to 
fund a private message on a license plate that is in opposition with their own beliefs). 
157 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2630 (establishing that the Court decided not to address the 
constitutional issue).  The Court further explained the union could give a refund for the 
employees that object to the funds used for political causes.  Id.; see Arlen W. Langvardt, 
Public Concern Revisited:  A New Role for an Old Doctrine in the Constitutional Law of Defamation, 
21 VAL. U. L. REV. 241, 255 n.109 (1987) (expressing that ethical, literary, social, economic, and 
artistic matters are entitled to First Amendment protection in its entirety). 
158 See Huebert, supra note 96, at 210 (acknowledging that up until Knox, the non-members 
could be forced to pay union fees).  The Court in Knox recognized the flaw and gave the 
suggestion that the Court may reconsider Abood in a subsequent case.  Id.  The issue in Knox 
was whether non-members of a union could be required to pay a temporary increase in fees 
for political purposes with no opportunity to opt out and no notice.  See Knox v. SEIU, Local 
1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2284–85 (2012) (recognizing the public-sector union issue within Knox).  
The Court held that the First Amendment did not permit the union to increase the fees with 
no notice when coupled with the opportunity to opt out.  See Huebert, supra note 96, at 210 
(reporting that seven Justices decided that First Amendment protection disallowed unions 
to increase their fees). 
159 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2631 (ruling that Street did not reach any constitutional issues 
and was resolved as a matter of statutory construction.); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of 
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220 (1977) (holding that the RLA could be construed to avoid the 
constitutional issues). 
160 See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289 (stating that First Amendment objections carry more weight 
than the free rider arguments).  For example, a community organization that cleans a 
geographical area would have citizens that free ride on their services.  See Huebert, supra 
note 96, at 210 (suggesting that doctors may be free riders under a medical lobbying group).  
Few people would argue that the citizens within the community should have to pay for the 
services.  Id. 
161 See Huebert, supra note 96, at 210 (examining whether Justice Alito’s majority opinion 
took the necessary step to question the mandatory union fees, thus producing inconsistencies 
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If a community association engages in a clean-up 
campaign or opposes encroachments by industrial 
development, no one suggests that all residents or 
property owners who benefit be required to contribute.  If 
a parent-teacher association raises money for the school 
library, assessments are not levied on all parents.  If an 
association of university professors has a major function 
bringing pressure on universities to observe standards of 
tenure and academic freedom, most professors would 
consider it an outrage to be required to join.  If a medical 
association lobbies against regulation of fees, not all 
doctors who share in the benefits share in the costs.162 
The free rider argument is considered an anomaly because the argument 
works solely to further labor peace.163 
Fourth, there was also a great concern with non-member funds paying 
for political activities.164  Justice Alito correctly noted that if union 
employees opt in the full-fledged union fees, as opposed to the opt out 
strategy, then the risk of using fees to further ideological ends would 
cease.165  Justice Alito raised a good point when he asked rhetorically why 
the burden should be on the non-member when opting out of making the 
payments because there was an inherent unfairness imposed on the public 
employees.166  In addition, employees would face a significant burden if 
they were required to raise issues concerning their subsidized speech 
when unions could impose a new assessment of chargeable expenditures 
at any time.167 
                                                 
among the Court and furthering the need for statutory change). 
162 Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289–90.  The agency fee primarily promoted labor peace and reduced 
the employees from free riding on the services.  Id. at 2290. 
163 See id. (acknowledging the anomaly with accepting the free rider arguments to further 
labor peace).  The Court used the anomaly to further labor peace in the past.  Id. 
164 See Huebert, supra note 96, at 211 (stressing concern over the burden on non-members 
to ensure that none of their funds were being used for political activity).  The concern mainly 
deals with the burden being placed on the employees for protection against coerced speech.  
Id. 
165 See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2290 (stating that an opt out system, as opposed to an opt in 
system, establishes a risk that funds will be used for political purposes); Huebert, supra note 
96, at 211 (recognizing the impingement on the employees’ freedom of association with the 
opt out system imposed by unions). 
166 See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2290 (questioning the justification for placing the burden on the 
non-members of a union to show that they do not want to pay for the extra costs when they 
inherently have less bargaining power).  The Court should have a system of accountability 
so that non-member funds are not used, even temporarily, to fund political activities.  Id. 
167 See id. at 2294 (establishing that unions can create chargeable expenditures by utilizing 
a broad viewpoint in its description to the auditors).  In addition, objecting employees would 
have to utilize more funds, on top of the amount compelled by the unions, to object to the 
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Fifth, Abood failed to distinguish compelled support between public-
sector and private-sector unions due to the public-sector unions’ 
capability of fulfilling many civic and political positions during its role in 
collective bargaining.168  Unlike a private employer, the government 
makes decisions concerning employee pay that directly affect public 
policy through taxpayer dollars, thus requiring the need for change 
through amending the Employees’ Rights statute.169  As a government 
employer, the roles of collective bargaining and lobbying in the public 
sector are closely related and is a key reason why the analysis concerning 
private employees in Hanson and Street should not be used.170 
In Abood, the Court made a distinction between non-members opting 
out of paying fees for activities not relevant to collective bargaining, and 
the government authority compelling the non-member’s support for 
activities in connection with collective bargaining.171  This distinction is 
unclear because both types of speech are political, but still does not clarify 
whether non-members will be forced to pay unions for political speech 
unrelated to collective bargaining.172  Furthermore, the effort to uphold 
First Amendment rights could make little sense for non-members because 
that would require the non-members to review the union’s expenditure 
report and proper use of employee funds.173 
                                                 
union’s chargeability determinations.  Id.  In essence, there is a barrier to entry for 
challenging the union expenditures.  Id. 
168 See id. at 2289 (describing the reason why compulsory fees are compelled speech and 
prohibited by the First Amendment).  Knox did not revisit prior cases to determine if First 
Amendment rights provided adequate recognition.  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289.  See Huebert, 
supra note 96, at 205 (distinguishing the flaw in Abood’s analysis between the public-sector 
and private-sector unions).  Unions that deal with government employees are inherently 
political, and the First Amendment case law prohibits forced support of political speech.  Id. 
169 See Huebert, supra note 96, at 205–06 (acknowledging that unions take positions that 
have powerful civic and political consequence).  In this regard, the government is not similar 
to a private employer.  Id. 
170 See Lehnert v. Farris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 520 (1991) (supporting the close 
analogy between collective bargaining and lobbying because of the dual roles of the 
government as the policymaker and employer).  In the case of personal assistants, unions are 
essentially lobbyists that can legally force employees to pay for its advocacy.  See Huebert, 
supra note 96, at 206 (identifying that unions can only argue for more money and benefits). 
171 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235–36 (1977) (deciding that the 
Constitution only requires that expenditures be funded from dues, assessments, or charges 
paid by non-objecting employees that are not coerced into joining against their will). 
172 See Huebert, supra note 96, at 206 (acknowledging that non-members may still be 
compelled to pay because the union’s auditors do not question the credibility of chargeable 
union dues). 
173 See id. at 207 (examining the costly efforts needed to challenge a fraction of the fees 
associated with switching from being a member to being a non-member of a union, including 
participating in hearings, filing the unfair labor practice charge with the court, and pursuing 
appeals). 
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The coerced union support harms the employees’ First Amendment 
rights and distorts the influence on public policy.174  If the government 
coerces people with opposing views to support a contrary group, then the 
political forum is non-existent.175  The public unions are given an unfair 
advantage because the cost to compete against them may be prohibitively 
high for employees.176 
Sixth, if Illinois’ argument to expand the coverage of Abood to 
government subsidy recipients were upheld in Harris, the distortion 
would expand beyond the subsidy recipients.177  Forcing a union fee on 
subsidy recipients essentially gives the union more state funds to achieve 
whatever political goals the union has in mind, including reelecting the 
same state officials who enabled the unionization and supported their 
policies.178  In addition, if people opt out of the union dues, they will still 
pay for some of the representation.179  As a consequence of appointing 
representatives for the subsidy recipients, the incumbent officials could 
shift the electoral process in their favor and weaken the competition in 
governmental policies and ideas that the First Amendment is designed to 
protect.180 
Creating a cycle to fund political officials with union dues moves 
away from what should be the primary purpose:  collective bargaining.181  
                                                 
174 See id. at 207–08 (exposing the bias coerced speech has on the marketplace for political 
ideas towards the union’s favor that potentially decreases everyone’s ability to influence 
public policy).  In Knox, the Court stated that the First Amendment created an environment 
where all can achieve their political goals without hindrance from the state.  See Knox v. 
SEIU, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2295 (2012) (requiring public-sector unions to obtain the 
non-members affirmative consent before they exact funds from those non-members). 
175 See Huebert, supra note 96, at 207–08 (asserting that coercing one group to support 
another cannot exist under the Constitution). 
176 See id. at 208 (discussing that the costs of opposing union views may be too high for 
employees to voice an opinion, thus effectively chilling employee speech). 
177 See id. (stressing the bad consequences resulting from the expansion).  The problem with 
covering government subsidy recipients is that the Abood standard would expand to all 
subsidy recipients, rather than just personal assistants.  Id. 
178 See id. (inferring that requiring subsidy recipients to pay dues to a union is good for 
politicians, but bad for employees because the money goes to the politician’s pockets).  
Change must be made to the current labor law for unions to continue serving the collective 
bargaining purpose.  See Becker, supra note 94, at 1647 (acknowledging that the law must 
change because the political parties evolve their behavior to the law). 
179 See Huebert, supra note 96, at 208 (recognizing little doubt that non-members will have 
to pay for some of representation expenses due to the burden placed on the employees to 
opt out of the union’s political funding). 
180 See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976) (noting that the right to support a political 
association goes to the heart of the First Amendment).  The protection provides an 
opportunity for uninhibited debate on political issues.  Id. 
181 See Huebert, supra note 96, at 209 (exposing the system where the officials receive 
monetary funds from employees, and in turn, make contributions to public officials).  The 
personal assistants did not satisfy the compelling governmental interest of labor peace.  See 
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The government officials are aware of the many political opportunities 
from the unionization of personal assistants.182  In Harris, the executive 
orders raised more questions about compelled speech through agency fees 
because the orders benefited top political supporters for both governors.183  
For instance, the groups affiliated with SEIU were former Illinois 
Governor Pat Quinn’s largest contributors, donating approximately 
eighteen percent of all contributions—much more than all the amounts 
combined from the Democratic Party committee.184  The Court knew the 
impact unions have on political parties, which is part of the reason why 
the Court declined to overturn Abood at that time.185 
C. Uncertainty of the Ruling 
The Court did not want to make the decision to overturn Abood for 
two reasons.186  First, only five votes were needed to overturn Abood, and 
the critics believe the Court hesitated to overturn the precedent because of 
the uncertainty of the fifth vote.187  People believe the Court decided to 
wait for another case to become relevant in the judicial system to address 
the issue more precisely, which gave the Justices more time to understand 
the importance of overturning Abood.188  Adaptation was the second 
                                                 
id. at 216  (stating that labor peace was not a compelling government interest in Harris).  The 
assistants did not intend to compete with the union, just the right to opt out of contributions 
to the union.  See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2640 (2014) (holding the agency fee does 
not satisfy the Knox test).  The conflicting demands were lessened because the union’s 
purpose was to increase pay and benefits, while providing little to no other benefits.  Id. 
182 See Huebert, supra note 96, at 208 (describing the government officials as being well 
aware of the opportunities from the unionization of personal assistants). 
183 See id. at 209 (asserting that SEIU gave roughly $825,000 to Blagojevich’s 2002 
campaign).  Two months after Blagojevich began his term as governor, he recognized SEIU 
as the exclusive representative for personal assistants.  Id. 
184 See id. (expressing that SEIU gave over $4.3 million to Governor Quinn’s election).  The 
power to force union support could create a cycle where unions make monetary donations 
to public officials; the public officials compel the subsidy recipients to make monetary 
contributions to the union; and the union makes more contributions to the public officials.  
Id.  This system effectively compels employee speech.  Id. 
185 See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing the system of using funds to 
promote public officials). 
186 See Eastman, supra note 112 (examining the reasons against completely overturning 
Abood). 
187 See id. (stating that one or more of the Justices in the majority thought Abood could not 
be properly distinguished, which delayed the overruling until another case comes to the 
court with more applicable facts). 
188 See id. (recognizing the need to wait to make a subsequent decision on the matter).  
Another case that may come to the Court’s docket deals with public teachers from California.  
See LaFetra, supra note 114 (recognizing that Abood has been detrimental for individual rights 
for over forty years).  Between the time of Harris and this Note being published, the U.S. 
Supreme Court issued an opinion in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association that concerned 
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reason people believe the Court decided to wait for a new case.189  The 
holding in Harris v. Quinn is a major step towards overturning Abood and 
expanding the right to refuse agency fee payments to all public 
employees.190  If the Court, instead, decided to expand the initial holding 
from quasi-public employees having the right to opt out of agency fees, 
the decision would have been outside the scope of the facts in the case.191  
The reason the decision would have been outside the scope is because 
Harris did not deal with full-fledged public employees, but rather a hybrid 
form of a public employee that was solely considered to be public for 
collective bargaining reasons.192  Furthermore, by waiting for a different 
fact scenario in another case to address all public employees, the unions 
have more time to adapt to the new rule and prepare for Congress to give 
all non-members the right to disassociate themselves from agency fees 
without repercussions.193 
The ruling in Harris further introduces more ambiguity into the law, 
rather than clarity.194  Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion noted the 
majority created a perverse result by punishing the state for managing its 
program in a decentralized way that respects the independence and 
                                                 
overruling Abood, No. 14-915, 2016 WL 1191684, at *1 (Mar. 29, 2016).  After oral arguments, 
but before the issuance of this opinion, Justice Scalia passed away, which led to the Court 
splitting four-to-four in a one sentence opinion on the issue of overruling Abood.  Id.  Thus, 
the Court set no legal precedent and left the constitutional issue still in the air, which further 
necessitates the need for this Note's proposed amendment to the Employees’ Rights statute.  
Id. 
189 See Eastman, supra note 112 (discussing the potential future attacks on Abood that may 
be brought within the near future). 
190 See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014) (holding that the First Amendment 
prohibits unions from collecting agency fees from personal assistants).  The Court noted that 
third parties are not allowed to subsidize speech from people that do not wish to support the 
material.  Id. 
191 See Eastman, supra note 112 (describing the process of completely overturning Abood 
would restructure employment across the country).  Eastman believes that there was at least 
one Justice in the majority that will choose not to overrule Abood outright.  Id.  The courts 
also proved that public employees should be treated differently than private employees 
because they are different.  Id. 
192 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2626 (establishing the requirement for vicarious liability in tort 
and advocating for health insurance benefits).  The union was used solely to retrieve 
feedback from the personal assistants to make their home delivery services more efficient.  
Id. at 2641.  The Court raised that the analysis was questionable on several grounds.  See 
Eastman, supra note 112 (acknowledging that the Court did not distinguish between public 
union expenditures for political ends and collective bargaining purposes). 
193 See infra Part IV (recognizing the need for an amendment to the employees’ rights 
statute to give all public employees the right to opt out of agency fee payments). 
194 See Huebert, supra note 96, at 219 (stating that the ambiguity of the analysis is a reason 
for the court to completely overrule Abood).  The analysis in Abood is also poorly reasoned, 
but the Court’s composition could change with newly elected Justices.  Id. 
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dignity of program beneficiaries.195  If the state were to classify quasi-
public employees similar to full-fledged public employees, in regard to 
converting subsidy money to unwanted benefits, then would the payment 
of a mandatory union due be any more just?196  The result in this scenario 
produces more government control over personal assistants, healthcare 
patients, and coerced union fees, which is the true conflict within the 
reasoning.197  This line of questioning should result with the expansion of 
freedom of association to all public employees by amending the 
Employees’ Rights statute.198 
D. The Impact of Harris v. Quinn 
The impact of Harris v. Quinn will be significant for unions.199  In the 
short-term, over 20,000 personal assistants in Illinois will no longer be 
subject to agency fees.200  The effect may similarly expand to other states 
as well.201  This change could produce a negative impact on the unions 
because of the decrease in funding to support union expenditures.202  
However, after overruling Abood and expanding the holding in Harris to 
all public employees through amending the Employees’ Rights statute, the 
likelihood of the continued existence of the unions is high because other 
organizations have shown success by surviving off of only membership 
fees.203  In addition, the home-care workers in SEIU Healthcare Illinois 
                                                 
195 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2650 (Kagan, J, dissenting) (explaining the majority decision 
reached a perverse result by not following the legal precedent). 
196 See Huebert, supra note 96, at 218 (acknowledging the disadvantages of treating quasi-
public employees as full-fledged public employees).  California teachers state that forcing 
public school teachers to make payments to labor unions violates their First Amendment 
rights.  See LaFetra, supra note 114 (articulating that the Abood standard proved to be 
insufficient over time to protect the constitutional rights of public employees). 
197 See Huebert, supra note 96, at 218 (noting that it is not satisfactory to force employees to 
pay union fees that they do not want to pay).  Other industries in the public-sector are 
moving away from unionization.  See Parker, supra note 115 (stating that the home child care 
businesses throughout Vermont voted against unionization by a vote of 418 to 398).  The 
union will have to wait another year before filing for another vote.  Id. 
198 See infra Part IV (explaining the Employees’ Rights statute needs to be amended to give 
all public employees the right to associate with any organization of their choice). 
199 See Kramer & Ditelberg, supra note 98 (discussing the potential short and long term 
impact resulting from Harris). 
200 See id. (describing the proportion of full union members versus fair-share fee payers as 
unknown). 
201 See id. (acknowledging the decrease in funding may hinder unions in their ability to 
represent all employees in the bargaining unit). 
202 See id. (explaining the significance to the labor movement).  38.7% of the public-sector 
employees are represented by a union. Id.  If public-sector employees do not have to pay the 
agency fees, it may be a critical blow to the public-sector unions. Id. 
203 See infra Part IV (stating that unions can still function without the agency fee). 
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project a wage increase after the decision of Harris.204  This increase 
suggests that the union goals of increasing the working standards will 
continue even without the agency payments from quasi-public 
employees.205 
The long-term impact needs to be addressed to fully conceptualize the 
magnitude of Harris.206  The holding will likely bring an increase in 
litigation that will sway the tipping point from quasi-public employees to 
encompass all public employees because of the necessity to protect the 
freedom of association.207  In addition, the decrease in funding could 
decrease the political power of the public sector unions.208  However, 
unlike what many union supporters believe, employers have been 
adamant about improving the working conditions to better serve 
employee needs, thus taking away from the unions’ purpose.209  
Furthermore, this decision could expand to the private sector, but that is 
beyond the scope of this Note.210 
E. Future Ramifications of the Inconsistent Holdings 
There will be future ramifications once Congress steps in to deal with 
the inconsistent holdings.211  In states that eliminated the requirement of 
agency payments by non-union members, the total number of jobs and the 
union memberships increased.212  In contrast to benefits, the amount of 
funding necessary for union expenditures may significantly decrease.213 
                                                 
204 See Kelleher, supra note 97 (showing that in the year of 2014, SEIU membership amount 
increased to 10,000 personal assistants within the home care industry).  But see Brunner, supra 
note 113 (recognizing that some state employees are still paying for the political functions of 
unions even after notifying the unions and objecting numerous times). 
205 See Kelleher, supra note 97 (explaining that the ruling in Harris will be a shot of 
adrenaline for the unions and employees). 
206 See infra Part IV (expanding on the holding in Harris by providing an amendment to the 
Employees’ Rights statute). 
207 See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014) (holding that the First Amendment 
prohibits unions from collecting agency fees from personal assistants); see also Kramer & 
Ditelberg, supra note 98 (stating the potential short-term and long-term impact about the 
future of unions). 
208 See McHenry, supra note 96, at 601 (reasoning the decline in union membership is due 
to the failure of the union’s adjustment to the economic realities). 
209 See Mayer, supra note 96, at 17 (finding that there is greater job satisfaction among non-
members of unions because some unions adapted to focus more of their intention on 
employee concerns). 
210 See infra Part IV (acknowledging that the contribution deals with public employees). 
211 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977) (noting that unions can spend 
funds on political purposes as long as the employees do not object). 
212 See Gantert, supra note 93 (stating that the jobs and wages increased in right to work 
states). 
213 See Mirer, supra note 59, at 33 (discussing the negative impacts of free riders on the 
union membership system).  The depletion in money from the agency fees suggests that the 
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In addition, the analysis in Harris v. Quinn could lead practitioners to 
focus on other arguments necessary for overturning Abood.214  For 
instance, Abood failed to distinguish the difference between opposition of 
union speech in the private-sector and in the public-sector.215  In addition, 
Abood failed to distinguish the difficulty of classifying expenditures 
between achieving political ends and collective bargaining purposes.216  
Furthermore, the analysis in Abood relies upon an unsupported 
assumption stating that the exclusive representation in the public-sector 
is dependent on an agency shop system, which is not justified by any 
facts.217 
Overturning Abood follows the decreasing trend of union 
memberships suggesting that a majority of public employees will be 
satisfied with the opportunity to choose the option of supporting a 
union.218  Compulsory membership dues provide a significant amount of 
funding for union expenditures.219  The agency fees alone bring in millions 
of dollars for public unions.220  Furthermore, studies suggest that the 
aggregate drop in union membership may negatively impact public union 
                                                 
union coffers and resources will be depleted.  Id.  Without the resources, the unions cannot 
process grievances for arbitrations or be able to build a strike fund to protect employees.  Id.  
This process may lead to union members questioning whether there is any incentive to join 
a union, but generally the benefits are enough to keep the current members around.  Id. 
214 See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2632–34 (2014) (describing the concerns with Abood’s 
reasoning).  One of the arguments is that unions can survive on voluntary, rather than 
mandatory, fees.  Id. at 2631; Zoeller v. Sweeney, 19 N.E.3d 749, 753 (Ind. 2014). 
215 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632 (stating that there is substantial importance in 
distinguishing between public and private-sector bargaining).  The political issues involved 
with public-sectors are vastly different than the private-sector.  Id.  These issues are brought 
up through the negotiation of benefits, pensions, and wages that are not driven in the private 
sector.  Id. 
216 See id. at 2632–33 (establishing that collective bargaining concerns lobbying, political 
advocacy, and the union’s dealings with the employers).  However, in the public sector, 
political advocacy, collective bargaining, and lobbying are geared towards the government.  
Id. 
217 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2634 (acknowledging that exclusive representation is not 
dependent on an agency shop or union).  The reliance on an unsupported empirical 
assumption is one of the main reasons why Abood should no longer be the standard.  Id. 
218 See McHenry, supra note 96, at 601 (stating that the employee trend is to forgo union 
protection).  Employees are already protected by federal laws and may not feel the desire to 
seek union protection.  Id.  In addition, many employers have become more sophisticated 
and aggressive in resisting unionization.  Id. 
219 See Kersey, supra note 92 (recognizing that millions of dollars go to unions every year 
from agency fees).  The problem with this system is that unions want the state government 
to be more expensive to have more money for political funding.  Id. 
220 See Gantert, supra note 93 (explaining the correlation between a right to work state’s 
economy as growing and vibrant and the non-right to work state’s economy as aging and 
stagnant). 
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treasuries.221  However, history shows that union memberships decreased 
from the mid-1950s to current day and most likely will continue to 
decrease.222 
The ruling in Harris will benefit many Americans by protecting the 
freedom of association of all non-members of unions.223  Personal 
assistants and subsidy recipients in Illinois will no longer have to support 
union representation through mandatory dues in opposition of their 
views.224  Other groups have already sought help since the decision was 
rendered.225  In addition, states suspended unions from collecting agency 
fees from personal assistants.226  The National Right to Work Legal 
Defense Foundation will be the organization that enforces the states to 
comply with the Supreme Court ruling.227 
By failing to completely overturn Abood, the United States Supreme 
Court leaves the question open for future judicial intervention.228  While 
some people may argue the best remedy is for the case law to develop, 
full-fledged public employees will continue to have their freedom of 
association infringed if the courts do not address the issue immediately.229  
                                                 
221 See Greenhouse, supra note 95 (discussing the effect on the unions’ treasuries and 
memberships).  The drop in union memberships will protect the nation’s families from the 
union influence.  Id. 
222 See Becker, supra note 94, at 1644 (describing that the public sector density rose over 
time).  The union density decreased in Wisconsin from forty percent in 1959 to seven percent 
in 2011 when Governor Walker gutted the public-sector bargaining law.  Id. 
223 See Huebert, supra note 96, at 219 (reiterating that many Americans will benefit from 
Harris because the holding is a win for First Amendment rights).  Other family-care providers 
in Washington challenged the union’s capability of charging agency fees to full-fledged 
public employees.  See Brunner, supra note 113 (acknowledging that the purpose of the 
lawsuit is to build upon the Harris decision). 
224 See Huebert, supra note 96, at 219 (believing that Illinois’ personal assistants will be free 
from government compulsion with regards to agency fees). 
225 See id. at 220 (supporting the implementation of agency fees through evidence of 
employees using Harris to move around the forced unionization from Governor 
Blagojevich’s order).  The Freedom Foundation challenged the SEIU to force the union to 
stop deducting fees from the non-members paychecks.  See Brunner, supra note 113 (seeking 
to build this lawsuit on the Harris decision to give all public employees the option to opt out 
of agency fees). 
226 See Huebert, supra note 96, at 220 (demonstrating that Connecticut suspended the 
agency fee system for personal assistants). 
227 See id. (“If any state doesn’t comply, the National Right to Work Legal Defense 
Foundation and others will no doubt be ready to go to court to make sure they do—until no 
one is forced to give money to a union simply because he or she receives a government 
subsidy.”). 
228 See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014) (holding that unions cannot compel 
agency fees from quasi-public employees, but leaving the option for all public employees 
open for future congressional or judicial intervention). 
229 See infra Part IV.B (addressing the concern of needing congressional intervention to 
solve the agency fee issue). 
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In addition, there is no telling who the next Supreme Court Justice will be 
after the death of Justice Scalia, which makes an amendment to the 
Employees’ Rights statute even more necessary after the recent split four-
to-four decision in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association that 
addressed overruling Abood. 230  Due to the uncertainty of the time period, 
Congress is in the best position to settle the issue by amending a statute.231 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Although the Employees’ Rights statute gives employees many rights 
with regard to labor organizations, more rights still need to be introduced 
to protect the right of freedom of association and give the employees the 
opportunity to opt out of agency fees.232  Amending the statute to give 
employees the right to refuse agency fees is an effective way of protecting 
their freedom of association because it eliminates the unions’ use of 
subsidized speech.233  This contribution is based on the employee raising 
his statutory right before the Supreme Court renders a decision with nine 
Justices. 
Congress is in the best position to protect all public employees from 
unions subsidizing their speech.234  The ability to hear the respective 
arguments from all sides of the issue—unions, public employees, 
employers, and lobbying groups—will provide the best input and 
establish a rule that best fits the public employees’ interest.235  The 
inconsistent cases dealing with the issue of public employees’ protection 
against subsidized speech makes action through the legislature important 
for the parties, attorneys, judges, and unions involved.236  Therefore, 
Congress is in the best position to provide statutory relief to public 
                                                 
230 See No. 14-915, 2016 WL 1191684, at *1 (Mar. 29, 2016) (affirming the judgment of the 
Court by a split decision); infra Part IV.B (recognizing that congressional intervention is the 
best way to move forward with a solution). 
231 See infra Part IV.A (amending the Employees’ Rights statute to include all public 
employees and the ability to opt out of paying agency fees). 
232 See supra Part III.A (discussing the importance of protecting public employees’ freedom 
of association); see also infra Part IV.B (arguing that employees’ right to freedom of association 
is negatively impacted each day the Court or legislature delays action). 
233 See supra Part I (posing a hypothetical scenario where the plaintiff is confronted with 
the issue of subsidized speech, but with no remedy against payment of the agency fee). 
234 See supra Part II.B–D (recognizing the evolution of court decisions concerning agency 
fees, freedom of association, and the progression from Abood). 
235 See supra Part III.D (acknowledging the necessity to provide statutory protections for 
public employees’ freedom of association). 
236 See supra Part II.B–D (describing the inconsistency and evolution between the cases that 
lead up to the Harris decision). 
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employees by amending the Employees’ Rights statute to enable public 
employees to refuse agency fees.237 
The remainder of Part IV focuses on amending the Employees’ Rights 
statute by adding a sub-section for Congress.238  The language in the 
proposed section will ensure that public employees, employers, unions, 
and judges have proper guidance when confronted with future issues 
involving public employees and agency fees.239 
A. Proposed Amendment to the Employees’ Rights Statute Section 7102 
Congress should amend Section 7102 to include the following 
proposed language: 
Each public employee shall have the right to form, join, or 
assist any labor organization, or to refrain from any such 
activity, freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal, and 
each employee shall be protected in the exercise of such 
right.  Except as otherwise provided under this chapter, 
such right includes the right— 
(1) to act for a labor organization in the capacity of a 
representative and the right, in that capacity, to present 
the views of the labor organization to heads of agencies 
and other officials of the executive branch of the 
Government, the Congress, or other appropriate 
authorities, and 
(2) to engage in collective bargaining with respect to 
conditions of employment through representatives 
chosen by employees under this chapter, and 
(3) to refuse payment of any compelled membership due or 
agency fee imposed by a union while still receiving a reduced 
form of union benefits.  Any and all claims against employees 
for refusal to pay agency fees must be brought before the 
National Labor Relations Board within thirty (30) days of the 
alleged breach.240 
                                                 
237 See infra Part IV.A (providing a proposed section to the statute that will allow public 
employees to opt out of the mandatory agency fees imposed by unions). 
238 See infra Part IV.A (explaining the new statutory language to add to the Employees’ 
Rights statute to alleviate the inconsistencies among court cases addressing the issue of 
agency fees); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing the placement, reasoning, and arguments 
over the proposed section). 
239 See infra Part IV.B (discussing the advantages of having the right of public employees 
to refuse agency fees as the new standard). 
240 The regular portion of the text comes from 5 U.S.C. § 7102.  The italicized portion of the 
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B. Commentary 
Congress should insert the amended section between 5 U.S.C. § 7102, 
discussing the employees’ rights to assist, join, or form any labor 
organization, and 5 U.S.C. § 7103, discussing the definitions for the terms 
used throughout the chapter.241  This placement is the most appropriate 
because this section will distinguish the right of the public employers from 
private employers with the right to refuse agency fees.242  In addition, this 
section will lead into Section 7103 that provides definitions.243 
The proposed amendment applies to all public employees, rather than 
just employees that work in the private sector, to combat the usage of 
agency fees used for political purposes.244  Public employees refer to all 
people employed by the government, including, but not limited to, police 
officers, teachers, and public health care workers.245  Subsection 3 permits 
public employees to opt out of the mandatory dues imposed on non-union 
members for those people who do not want to join.246  The final section is 
crafted to prevent unreasonable delays from the parties involved and to 
help resolve congestion within the court system.247  The proposed section 
is the best solution because of the clear direction and guidance to the 
attorneys, judges, and parties involved.248  In addition, the proposed 
section eliminates the uncertainty in waiting for another case with the 
necessary facts to appear before the Court that could take years to 
establish.  Furthermore, implementing this section will clear up the 
inconsistencies in the Court’s decision concerning subsidized speech of 
public employees.249 
Critics may argue that employees can always quit and go find work 
somewhere else.250  This theory ignores the fact that there may be no other 
                                                 
text represents the additions made by the author. 
241 The reasoning for the suggested placement of the proposed section is the contribution 
of the author. 
242 The suggested placement of the proposed section is the contribution of the author. 
243 The proposed section’s placement is the contribution of the author. 
244 See supra Part IV.A (providing the proposed section to the Employees’ Rights statute). 
245 See supra Part IV.A (“Each public employee shall have the right to form, join, or assist 
any labor organization, or to refrain from any such activity, freely and without fear of penalty 
or reprisal, and each employee shall be protected in the exercise of such right.”). 
246 See supra Part IV.A (“(3) to refuse payment of any compelled membership due or agency fee 
imposed by a union while still receiving a reduced form of union benefits.”). 
247 See supra Part IV.A (“Any and all claims against employees for refusal to pay agency fees must 
be brought before the National Labor Relations Board within 30 days of the alleged breach.”). 
248 See supra Part IV.A (establishing a basis for employees to rely upon, rather than hoping 
for future court decisions that may never come). 
249 See supra Part II (describing the changes and inconsistencies among the Supreme Court 
decisions concerning the agency fees). 
250 See supra Part II.D (discussing the argument throughout Harris). 
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reasonable alternatives for those employees with specialized skills.  For 
instance, those who are firefighters, teachers, police officers, and tax 
professionals would have to undergo expensive and time consuming 
training to pursue other professions.  The transition from each specialized 
job would be unduly burdensome on the public employees.  Without 
reasonable alternatives, the employees must work as public employees to 
maintain their standard of living. 
Critics may also argue that agency fees do not support speech and 
should still be required to represent all employees within the bargaining 
unit.251  Although this may be low on the compelled speech scale, public 
employees are still being forced to fund and support an ideology that may 
be in opposition of their own views.  In addition, unions are only required 
to represent all employees in the bargaining unit if it is selected as the 
exclusive bargaining agent.  However, unions have the authority to be a 
members-only bargaining unit.252  This clarification solves the issue of 
representing employees who do not want to pay the agency fee. 
Opponents may contend that unions will fail without the agency fees 
due to a lack funding for resources.  There are organizational groups 
outside of unions that operate in a similar fashion by advocating on behalf 
of the interests of the group members.253  In addition, these organizational 
groups have a history of being successful even by depending on voluntary 
contributions.254  The evidence suggests that unions, similar to the 
organizational groups, could survive off of voluntary contributions and 
still function at an adequate level.255  The survival and continued 
implementation of unions are important because the argument from the 
opposition loses credibility with the unions still successfully functioning 
without requiring the mandatory agency fees from all public employees 
who are non-members of a union.256 
Finally, opponents may contend that this amendment will create an 
influx of free riders that may force unions to fail.257  This ignores the fact 
that non-members are required to pay a fee for being non-members; the 
non-members do not have full access to the union benefits; and the non-
members are solely paying the union for the protection.  If the union exists 
                                                 
251 See supra Part II.D (articulating the effect of agency fees among public employees). 
252 See Zoeller v. Sweeney, 19 N.E.3d 749, 753 (Ind. 2014) (recognizing that unions can 
determine to be a members-only organization). 
253 See supra Part II.D (reasoning that other organizations exist that advocate for members). 
254 See supra Part II.D (acknowledging that other organizations have survived through 
voluntary contributions). 
255 See supra Part II.D (examining the analogy the court draws in reaching its decision). 
256 See supra Part IV (explaining and reasoning through opposing arguments). 
257 See supra Part II.D (stating that the free rider argument failed when used for quasi-
public employees). 
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for the purpose of protecting employees’ rights and the employees do not 
find it necessary, then why should the employees have to pay?  
Furthermore, unions have the right to be the exclusive bargaining agent 
for an employer.  The just compensation for being the exclusive bargaining 
agent is paid with the right—not through forcing non-members to pay 
agency fees.258  The proposed amendment protects the employees’ 
freedom of association by giving the employees the right to opt out of 
agency fees.259 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court misapplied two cases in its analysis in Abood, 
which should be enough to reverse the decision and expand the holding 
in Harris to all public employees.260  Congress should recognize that 
freedom of association is an important right that needs to be protected 
from mandatory dues.  Once all public employees have the opportunity 
to opt out of mandatory payments, then the money that would normally 
go toward union fees can be used in the economy to further the nation’s 
economic growth.  The public unions will have to find ways to better serve 
and promote their services if they wish to keep or improve their 
membership numbers.  Public employees should no longer be required to 
support unions that have shown opposite beliefs through payment of the 
agency fee.  Tim would not be required to pay the agency fee with this 
proposed statutory amendment.  He would be free to opt out if the union 
supports views in opposition of his own.  Congress should change the 
requirements of mandatory dues to voluntary dues, thus giving more 
power to the individuals that make up the public workforce by protecting 
their freedom to speak without reprimand, to advocate for any 
organization, and to associate with any organization of their choosing. 
Ryan Sullivan* 
                                                 
258 See Zoeller v. Sweeney, 19 N.E.3d 749, 753 (Ind. 2014) (stating that just compensation is 
through the right to represent public employees). 
259 See supra note 240 and accompanying text (detailing the proposed changes to the 
Employees’ Rights statute). 
260 See supra Part III.B (analyzing Abood’s error in its analysis in relying upon Hanson and 
Street). 
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